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L2 learning and use. On the one side, we fi nd researchers investigating 
linguistic-cognitive issues, often using quantitative research methods 
including inferential statistics; on the other side, we fi nd researchers 
working on the basis of sociocultural or sociocognitive views, often 
using qualitative research methods including case studies and 
ethnography. Is there a gap in research in L2 learning and teaching? 
The present article developed from an invited colloquium at the 2013 
meeting of the American Association for Applied Linguistics in Dallas, 
Texas. It comprises nine single-authored pieces, with an introduction 
and a conclusion by the coeditors. Our overarching goals are (a) to raise 
awareness of the limitations of addressing only the cognitive or only 
the social in research on L2 learning and teaching and (b) to explore 
ways of bridging and/or productively appreciating the cognitive-
social gap in research. Collectively, the nine contributions advance 
the possibility that the approaches are not irreconcilable and that, 
in fact, cognitive researchers and social researchers will benefi t by 
acknowledging insights and methods from one another. 
 EDITORS’ INTRODUCTION 
 Learning a second language (L2) and developing pedagogy on the basis 
of what is known about learning are complex endeavors, and research 
into these areas has taken several different paths. One path is that taken 
by researchers investigating linguistic-cognitive issues, who pursue objec-
tivity with quantitative research methods, often with the help of inferential 
statistics. Another path is taken by researchers who consider the social 
context of activity as a cardinal feature of human knowledge and thus of 
learning and teaching and who employ qualitative research methods such 
as case study and ethnography. These are only two of many paths that 
researchers have taken, but they are perhaps the two that can be most 
easily discerned and most conveniently contrasted. Do these two paths lie 
on either side of the stream of knowledge, or is it possible that at one or 
more bends in the stream there is a bridge by which a researcher may 
cross to the other side? Pursuing this trope leads to the following ques-
tion: Is there a gap in research in L2 learning and teaching? And if there 
is, is the gap ontological (i.e., what  is the phenomenon we should be 
studying?), epistemological (i.e.,  how should we be studying it?), or both? 
 The present article is an attempt by researchers whom we perceive as 
taking different paths to discuss the extent to which they acknowledge a 
gap in their own research work and the possibility of a bridge between the 
path they have taken and the path taken by others. It developed from a 
colloquium organized by Hulstijn and Young that was designed to address 
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these issues at the 2013 meeting of the American Association for Applied 
Linguistics (AAAL) in Dallas, Texas. The colloquium focused on the ques-
tion of whether researchers who have taken different paths, which we 
blandly call the cognitive and the social ways, may benefi t from using 
insights and methods from one another. The premise was that, on each 
side, there are researchers who have become aware of the limitations of 
their own path and who are looking for possibilities to enrich their theories 
and research methods to attain more complete answers to the questions 
that they ask. Following on the 2013 AAAL event, the colloquium organizers 
invited the six colloquium presenters to write concise summaries of their 
individual positions, to be compiled into a larger, single piece. They also 
invited the colloquium discussant to join them as coeditor, and each of 
the three coeditors contributed his or her own individual refl ections. The 
product is the present article, which comprises nine single-authored 
pieces, bracketed by this introduction and a conclusion by the coeditors. 
 One question, raised but not answered during the colloquium, was 
whether we are dealing with gaps in the fi eld of SLA or with gaps in the 
broader fi eld of applied linguistics, or perhaps in the general domain of 
research in language learning and teaching. We recognize that the gap 
is particularly strongly felt in SLA. The reason is that, in some domains 
of research in L2 learning and teaching (such as language teaching, 
bilingual education, discourse analysis, and language ideology), the 
proportion of researchers taking a qualitative, interpretive, or relativist 
stance to epistemology is larger than in SLA and other related domains, 
such as technology and L2 learning or L2 assessment. Nevertheless, our 
position is that the gap is also felt in many different domains of applied 
linguistics because the nature of human language itself leads inevitably 
to distinct ways of studying it: as a resource and commodity for individ-
uals as writers and speakers and, at the same time, as a social vehicle 
for the creation and expression of culture. For some researchers in the 
many different domains of applied linguistics (see Chapelle,  2013 , for 
a recent overview of domains that can be discerned in this fi eld), the 
focus of their work may be on one view of language to the exclusion of 
the other, and they may have little sympathy for other interpretations. 
In the same fi eld, however, other applied linguists may be uncomfortably 
aware of the gap between their knowledge of language as an individual 
resource and their appreciation of how it functions in society. 
 This article is organized into three parts, addressing the following in 
turn: philosophy and theory construction, data and research methods, 
and unsolved problems and unasked questions. In using this format, the 
coeditors have preserved the three-part sequence of presentations in 
the colloquium. In each of the three parts, two scholars present their 
opinions—fi rst from a cognitive background and then from a social 
background—followed by a refl ection by one of the editors of this article. 
In Part 1, Robert DeKeyser and James P. Lantolf address questions of 
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philosophy and theory construction. For DeKeyser, scientifi c inquiry ulti-
mately strives for generalization, but to arrive there, he encourages a 
descriptive-correlational-experimental loop in which various approaches 
and methodologies inspire one another. Lantolf argues that there is no 
gap between cognitive and social approaches, and thus a bridge is not 
needed. Jan H. Hulstijn concludes this part by refl ecting on guidelines 
and criteria for distinguishing and deciding among competing theories. 
 In Part 2 of the article, Alison Mackey and Steven Talmy address issues 
of data and research methods. Mackey recounts a moment in her research 
within the interaction approach when she began to consider the social 
context of interaction as a factor creating conditions for successful 
input, output, and feedback. She calls for a balanced and collaborative 
approach involving research partnerships of paradigms and methods. 
Talmy remarks that, after the social turn in SLA, what is needed is what 
he calls an “interpretivist turn,” in which researchers recognize that all 
research is the outcome of the interpretive activity of particular people 
working within particular disciplinary and theoretical orientations—in 
particular, social contexts and historical moments. In concluding this part, 
Richard F. Young sees the origins of the interpretivist approach in Fleck’s 
(1935/1979) theory of the incommensurability between different thought 
collectives and thought styles. Young provides, however, several examples 
in the research literature on language use and language learning that are 
successful in reconciling apparently incommensurable thought styles. 
 In the third and fi nal part of the article, Nick C. Ellis and Martha 
Bigelow address a range of remaining unsolved problems and unasked 
questions. Ellis views language learning and use as an accomplishment 
of human social and cognitive competences, all functioning in the same 
complex adaptive system. He argues that partitioning the fi eld into 
social and cognitive theories stands in the way of creating an integra-
tive picture of language learning and use over different levels of granu-
larity and timescale, which requires a variety of data types analyzed 
with a plurality of research methods. Bigelow returns to consider the 
social and historical site of research into language learning, use, and 
teaching. She refl ects on the challenge that the dichotomy between 
social and cognitive approaches poses for beginning researchers, who 
often wish to investigate language development as both a cognitive and 
a social process. Recognizing that we are all actors in the stories behind 
the studies we do, her plea is for established researchers to try to 
bridge the divide themselves and to support beginning researchers to 
take risks in their own work. Lourdes Ortega concludes Part 3 by 
addressing recurrent themes. Although there may be many different 
ways to bridge the cognitive-social gap, Ortega emphasizes the importance 
of conceiving the gap not as an imminent disciplinary demise but as a com-
pelling invitation to construct and traverse bridges. Commensurability 
emerges, she argues, from an effort to break away from traditions 
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of perceiving and experiencing cognitive and social dimensions of L2 
learning and teaching as two monolithic blocks. The three editors close 
the article with brief concluding thoughts. 
 This nine-author piece is unconventional as a journal article, and, 
before leaving readers with it, we would be remiss if we did not 
acknowledge that the process of writing it has greatly challenged all of us. 
It has been particularly challenging as a new genre for the three of us 
who compiled and edited it. In preparing our own refl ections on what 
transpired in Dallas and what it all meant (at least to each of us), we 
listened to and transcribed the audio recordings of the colloquium. 
This process reminded us of many important contributions from the 
audience, but it also created a dilemma as to how we should properly 
recognize their ideas in the fi nal article. In the end, we have decided 
against verbatim transcriptions or individual attributions from the audi-
ence fl oor in this article. The reason is that, on the recordings, we recog-
nize the voices of many colleagues but cannot identify several others.  1  We 
are deeply grateful to each member in the audience who took the fl oor 
throughout the colloquium. All their voices, anonymous or familiar, have 
been instrumental in shaping the dialogue and the piece we offer here. 
 Part 1: Philosophy and Theory Construction 
 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE SOCIAL-COGNITIVE 
DICHOTOMY IN RESEARCH IN LANGUAGE LEARNING 
AND TEACHING 
 Robert DeKeyser 
 University of Maryland 
 Ever since the cognitive-versus-sociocultural debate that took place 
in various journals and at several conferences in the 1990s, many 
researchers in L2 learning and teaching are probably convinced that a 
wide gap between the two camps is unavoidable. Yet, both Jim Lantolf 
and I started off our individual contributions at the AAAL 2013 collo-
quium by saying that there does not need to be a gap. By the standards 
of the 1990s, we were off to a good start! 
 Why does there not need to be a wide gap? Why is it even surprising 
that we have a (perceived) gap? Obviously, most language learning 
takes place in social and cultural contexts that play a role in the learning 
process (and all language learning does, if you call the psycholinguistics 
laboratory a sociocultural context, too, albeit a highly marked one). 
Equally obviously, all social and cultural learning is at least in part a 
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cognitive process: We acquire social and cultural knowledge, and knowl-
edge and cognition are the same thing. Note that they are even etymolog-
ically related: The  -gn- in cognition and the  kn- in knowledge go back to 
the same Indo-European root (e.g., see Watkins,  2000 , pp. 32–33). 
 If that is all true, then why is there a widely perceived gap? The core 
problem, in my opinion, is that a number of dichotomies that have little 
to do with one another in principle do largely coincide with the cognitive-
social dichotomy in practice; this is apparent, for instance, in the way 
language learning research is currently practiced: Research can be quan-
titative versus qualitative, hypothesis testing versus hypothesis gener-
ating, and absolute versus relativist, and it can use truth versus esthetics 
as evaluation criteria. Equating all of these dichotomies amounts to 
confusing material objects (cognitive or social phenomena) with formal 
objects (aspects of the phenomena most amenable to certain disci-
plines, methodologies, approaches, etc.; e.g., see Maritain,  2005 , p. 67). 
 In principle, the quantitative-qualitative distinction does not belong 
here at all. Counterexamples abound of the cognitive equals quantita-
tive and social equals qualitative equations. Prominent examples of 
cognitive research that is not quantitative in nature are Piaget’s work in 
developmental psychology, Chomsky’s approach to language (which is 
not quantitative, and not even experimental), and much of the early 
work on fi rst language (L1) acquisition by researchers such as Grégoire 
(1937–1947), Leopold (1939–1949), Lewis ( 1936 ), or Weir ( 1962 ), which 
was, again, mostly not quantitative and not experimental in nature. Con-
versely, we all know of research in the social and cultural domains that 
is heavily quantitative in nature, such as the research on motivation 
for L2 learning in the social psychology tradition (e.g., Gardner,  1985 ; 
Lambert,  1972 ; MacIntyre,  2002 ) or Gelfand’s work (e.g., Gelfand et al., 
 2011 ) in social psychology and cultural anthropology that quantifi es 
essential features of a culture. 
 More inherent is the link between the quantitative-qualitative di-
chotomy and the distinction between hypothesis generating and hypo-
thesis testing. Quantitative and qualitative approaches do not simply 
mean presence or absence of lots of numbers. Although the two have 
been defi ned in many different ways, for me the most useful way of 
thinking about them is that quantitative research stresses reliability 
over validity and control over context, the opposite being true for qual-
itative research. As all four of these characteristics are desirable, both 
approaches have advantages. However, the observation that an emphasis 
on validity and context is better suited for hypothesis generating and that 
an emphasis on reliability and control is better for hypothesis testing is 
inescapable. Both are important, of course; the inductive-deductive cycle 
of hypothesis generating and testing is what allows for theory building 
and falsifying. Be that as it may, science strives for generalization (not 
even the biggest accumulation of facts amounts to science), and that 
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requires hypothesis testing. As most sociocultural work is exclusively 
qualitative and, hence, does not allow for hypothesis testing, the asso-
ciation between the sociocultural and the qualitative makes a research 
endeavor that is limited to the sociocultural inadequate from the point 
of view of the philosophy of science. This is not to say, of course, 
that a case study cannot be useful. It can be very important to help 
generate hypotheses for hypothesis-testing research, and it can also 
serve to refute some hypotheses by providing a counterexample. 
Much of our research, however, is about how strong (or how likely) the 
association between some variables is, and the study of a single case 
cannot do much to provide evidence for the correlation of variables 
over cases or the strength of correlation. (Of course I am not merely 
referring to research involving correlation coeffi cients here; com-
paring group averages for a given variable is also about establishing 
a relationship between variables, one variable being group member-
ship in this case.) 
 As previously pointed out, however, the association between the 
sociocultural approach and qualitative methodology is a mere fact, not 
a necessity. I see no reason why sociocultural research could not move 
from descriptive to explanatory to predictive, as long as the social 
dynamics it takes as its material object are not confounded with rela-
tivism to the point of rejecting the ideas of hypothesis testing and 
falsifi cation of theory. Without such a process, there is no criterion for 
selecting among theories (beyond their esthetic or political appeal), no 
generalizability, and no science. 
 Meanwhile, back in the real world of language learning and teaching, 
addressing the content questions that really matter from a theoretical 
and/or practice point of view is more important than philosophizing 
about methodologies. How does L2 fl uency develop? How does the cog-
nitive basis of profi ciency change over time? How do different kinds of 
practice at different stages of development change overall profi ciency 
and specifi c skills? These are examples of questions to which all teachers 
and learners can relate, even if they do not use the same jargon. 
 To provide answers to such questions, we need mixed-methods 
research of a longitudinal nature. Mixed-methods research can avoid 
the poor articulation between the quantitative and the qualitative that 
happens when they are largely separate bodies of literature; it is much 
better if one can have a descriptive-correlational-experimental loop 
(Rosenshine & Furst,  1973 ) within a large study and not just in the accu-
mulating body of literature. Longitudinal research is ideal for answering 
questions that address long-term development, as most of the ques-
tions in SLA do. Unfortunately, although both longitudinal research and 
mixed-methods research are already fairly rare in our fi eld, the combi-
nation of the two is largely unheard of. There are practical reasons for 
this, of course (e.g., the fi nances needed and the risk of unacceptable 
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levels of participant attrition). Other reasons, however, include the 
sociology of academia (individuals are reluctant to engage in endeavors 
that will not bear fruit until long after they should have received tenure 
or promotion) and probably also the fact that such research would 
not only combine qualitative and quantitative methodologies, which 
few academics are equally comfortable with, but also require social 
and cultural contextualization of the psycholinguistic fi ndings as well as 
cognitive interpretation of the social and cultural dynamics, two things 
that even fewer academics are used to. 
 While we wait for a new generation of more truly interdisciplinary 
teams of researchers, the best we can do is to encourage the descrip-
tive-correlational-experimental loop by letting various approaches and 
methodologies inspire one another, and ideally feed into one another, 
as the loop metaphor implies. Even if we manage to pull off a large-scale 
longitudinal mixed-methods study, the fact that answers to scientifi c 
questions come from bodies of literature and not from individual 
studies should always be in the backs of our minds. Therefore, the need 
to read and consult widely and to contribute to the loop (or spiral?) will 
be with us for a long time to come. 
 Ultimately, the ability of individual studies to contribute to this cumu-
lative body of work will be best served if we all strive for context and 
control, for reliability and validity, realizing that sometimes a trade-off 
is unavoidable. There is no such trade-off between the social and the 
cognitive; after all, Vygotsky himself emphasized the social nature of 
cognition. We must all strive for generalizability of our fi ndings, though, 
whether we are primarily cognitively or socioculturally oriented, and 
whether we try to improve generalizability by building more complex 
designs (e.g., aptitude-treatment interaction studies instead of mere 
method comparisons) or by designing simpler studies while keeping in 
mind their place in the descriptive-correlational-experimental loop. 
There is much value to many things beyond science (visual arts, fi lm, liter-
ature, literary criticism, journalism, etc.), but without a relentless pursuit 
of the generalizability of knowledge, there is no (social) science. 
 A BRIDGE NOT NEEDED 
 The Sociocultural Perspective 
 James P. Lantolf 
 The Pennsylvania State University 
 In inviting contributions to the 2013 AAAL colloquium, the organizers 
asked two key questions: Is there a gap between cognitive-linguistic and 
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social approaches to SLA, and, if so, is it due to epistemological or onto-
logical differences (or both)? According to the organizers, the answers 
to the questions matter because research in learning and teaching of a 
L2 risks “disintegrating into two irreconcilable approaches,” as the col-
loquium abstract read. Given the comments from the audience during 
the colloquium, it seems that the fault line is indeed due to epistemolog-
ical differences between those who engage in quantitative research—
presumably cognitivists—and those who carry out qualitative research—
presumably socialists (pun intended). As DeKeyser forcefully argued 
during the colloquium and in his contribution to the present article, 
however, the problem is not about the isomorphism between cognitive 
research and quantifi cation on the one hand and social research and 
qualitative analysis on the other. Science does not rely exclusively on 
quantifi cation to defi ne itself. Final confi rmation of Einstein’s general 
theory of relativity, for example, came from the observation of a single 
solar eclipse. Certainly, Vygotsky and his colleagues had no aversion to 
quantifi cation and made extensive use of inferential statistics in their 
research. (However, following a different research tradition, they reported 
on the outcome of their analysis as signifi cant or not and avoided clut-
tering their manuscripts with dense and, at times, impenetrable statis-
tical manipulations.) In DeKeyser’s words, science is the “relentless 
pursuit of the generalizability of knowledge,” a stance that clearly 
captures Vygotsky’s goal in proposing sociocultural theory as a new, 
unifi ed theory of psychology. In what follows, I present a brief account 
of Vygotsky’s proposal for overcoming what he characterized as the 
“abyss” (Vygotsky,  1997 , p. 311) between idealist and materialist 
approaches to psychology to explain why a sociocultural approach 
to language learning and teaching does not have to concern itself 
with ways of bridging gaps, be they cognitive-social, teaching-testing, or 
research-practice in nature. Vygotsky did not bridge them; he elimi-
nated them. 
 Vygotsky (1997, p. 311) perceived the crisis in psychology as ema-
nating from the Cartesian mind-body dualism that separated idealist 
from materialist approaches to the study of mind. The differences emerged 
from divergence in epistemological and ontological assumptions. The 
idealist side of the abyss privileged fi rst-person accounts of inner mental 
experiences (e.g., the subjective experience of consciousness based on 
Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy and Freud’s psychoanalysis of 
the unconscious), whereas the materialist branch comprised refl exolo-
gists (e.g., Pavlov) and behaviorists (e.g., Thorndike, Watson) who focused 
on bodily reactions to external stimuli (e.g., salivation in animals, button 
pushing in humans). He sought to overcome the crisis by constructing a 
unifi ed methodological orientation that would lead to reliable and general-
izable knowledge grounded in a materialist ontological perspective—a 
perspective that is explained in the discussion that follows. 
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 Although Vygotsky realized that the goal was to build a single science 
of psychology—a single epistemology—he recognized that this would 
be an impossibility if the discipline continued to accept “ two categories 
of being which are fundamentally, qualitatively heterogeneous and irre-
ducible to each other” (Vygotsky,  1997 , p. 314). Essentially, the creation 
of a single epistemology depended on the answer to the following onto-
logical question: What is the nature of human cognition? Young, in his 
contribution to the present article, proposes that understanding what 
cognition is is an epistemological and not an ontological problem. 
However, ontology is concerned not just with what is but also with the 
nature of what is (Hofweber,  2013 ). Vygotsky recognized that the prob-
lem could not be resolved by building bridges between idealism and 
materialism, because no matter how much traffi c crosses the bridges, 
the abyss is still there. Widdowson ( 2012 ), in discussing the theory-
practice gap, took a similar position, reminding readers that bridges 
“are a way of crossing from one side to another. The gap is still there 
and the difference remains” (p. 3). 
 The proposal Vygotsky offered was grounded in dialectical materialism 
(DM) and, more specifi cally, within the historical dialectic materialism 
(henceforth, HDM) of Marxist socioeconomic theory. To give a brief 
description, DM is predicated on the fundamental assumption that 
“nature alone, based on matter in motion, has a self-suffi cient existence; 
everything in human life is derived from and dependent upon the objec-
tive world” (Novack,  1978 , p. 119). Although everything is comprised of 
matter, it manifests itself in “an endless multitude of material objects 
and systems,” including human society, which may be different from 
nature but is at the same time “inseparably linked with it and has a 
material basis of existence” (Yurkovets,  1984 , p. 50). Thus, everything 
we encounter in the world is “matter in the process of development” 
(Yurkovets,  1984 , p. 51). Dialectical materialism is a specifi c manifesta-
tion of materialist theory, which holds that matter constantly undergoes 
motion and transformation as a result of the interpenetration of 
opposing forms of materiality. It postulates the universality of “the 
process of internal contradictions,” which operates in inorganic and 
organic nature as well as in society and human thinking, all of which 
have a material foundation (Novack,  1978 , p. 401). Among the dialectical 
processes are the “struggle and unity of opposites,” “the mutual transi-
tion of qualitative and quantitative transformations,” and “negation of 
the negation” (Yurkovets,  1984 , p. 33). 
 Although DM postulates that dialectical processes are universal and 
therefore operate in the four material domains previously mentioned, 
each domain requires domain-specifi c intermediate theories to explain 
the phenomena unique to its segment of reality (e.g., planetary motion in 
astrophysics, photosynthesis in biology, monetary systems in economics, 
cognition in psychology). Vygotsky’s task was to build an intermediate 
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theory for psychology that simultaneously took account of general dialec-
tical processes as well as domain-specifi c processes, concepts, and prin-
ciples. To achieve his goal, among other things, he borrowed two very 
important notions from HDM: (a) the concept of the  cell , which for Marx 
was commodity and served as the unit of analysis for Marx’s study of eco-
nomic formations, and (b) history and the process through which humans 
create their own life conditions. As the cell, or unit of analysis of his theory, 
Vygotsky proposed, not without controversy (see Wertsch,  1985 ), linguis-
tic meaning, and, as its investigative approach, he put forward the  genetic 
method (which is explained in the next few paragraphs). 
 Vygotsky argued that the fundamental dialectical process that gives 
rise to human thinking (i.e., consciousness) is the interpenetration of 
two different forms of matter: the human brain, which is subject to the 
laws of biological evolution, and human social activity, including social 
relationships shaped by institutions such as family, politics, economy, 
education, religion, leisure time, and so forth as well as the artifacts 
that humans create as they participate in the various institutional activ-
ities at the core of human life. He argued that consciousness is the 
consequence of social activity refl ected in the human brain. To use an 
analogy discussed by Vygotsky (1997, pp. 327–328), consciousness is 
the equivalent of an image refl ected in a mirror. The image is deter-
mined by the properties of the mirror, the object refl ected, and the light 
waves bouncing off the mirror—all of which are material. The image 
itself, however, is not. 
 Vygotsky recognized that the brain has a specifi c structure shaped 
over the course of biological evolution, and, as a consequence, it is 
endowed with certain mental capacities, which humans share with other 
primates (e.g., memory, perception, attention). What makes human 
thinking different from primates, however, is its voluntary, mediated 
nature, the source of which is found not in the brain but in the world of 
human sociocultural activity. Indeed, as Leontiev ( 2004 ) pointed out, 
“thousands of years of social history have produced more, in this 
respect, than millions of years of biological evolution” (p. 85).  2  
 Although the mirror analogy is useful in pointing to the nonmaterial 
quality of consciousness, the analogy has its limitations. For one thing, 
an image emerges from an object—the mirror—that cannot act on and 
change the world in the way consciousness operating through the 
human body can, and, for another, human bodies are themselves 
embedded in social formations that enhance the power of single indi-
viduals to shape the world in ways that have a refl exive effect on 
thinking. Thus, the interpenetration of world and brain-body results 
in bidirectional processes whereby each infl uences and potentially 
changes the other. 
 Vygotsky argued, therefore, that, given the ontological difference 
between the object of study of the physical sciences (i.e., the natural 
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world) and the object of study of materialist psychology (i.e., the dialec-
tical coupling of biology and sociocultural life), “new methods of inves-
tigation and analysis” were required (Vygotsky,  1978 , p. 58). The general 
methodological framework proposed by Vygotsky is usually referred to 
as  genetic analysis (see Wertsch,  1985 ). It is a methodology based on the 
fundamental notion that it is only in “movement that a body shows what 
it is” (Vygotsky,  1978 , p. 65). By “movement,” Vygotsky, relying on 
Marx’s analytic approach to the study of social and economic forces, 
meant the study of the history of a process as it emerges and changes 
over time. Vygotsky introduced the genetic method into four domains 
in which thinking could be studied: phylogenesis, which focused on 
comparisons of human and primate psychology; sociogenesis, which 
concerned itself with the development of human social formations 
(e.g., political, economic, educational, and religious institutions) and 
artifacts (e.g., language, numbers, art, music, computers, etc.) and their 
impact on thinking; ontogenesis, which highlighted the development of 
individuals throughout their lives as they came into contact with different 
social formations and artifacts; and microgenesis, a term not used by 
Vygotsky but coined by Wertsch (1985, p. 54) to capture experimental 
research designed to provoke development over the course of relatively 
short time periods. Vygotsky (1978, p. 61) referred to this type of research 
as experimental-developmental, in which the goal is to create cognitive 
development under laboratory conditions to understand how people 
appropriate and internalize different forms of mediation as they engage 
in practical tasks (for a fuller discussion, see Lantolf & Poehner,  2014 ). 
 For Vygotsky, explanation is achieved not through prediction but 
through reconstruction (sociogenesis) and construction (ontogenesis 
and experimental-developmental research). This is not to say that 
prediction and hypothesis testing do not enter into his methodolog-
ical approach, but these are predicated on a genetic epistemology. For 
instance, the theory predicts that changes in sociocultural circum-
stances are likely to effect changes in psychological processing. This 
was documented in Luria’s ( 1976 ) research among Uzbek peasant popu-
lations in the 1930s, whose thinking changed from a highly functional 
and pragmatic mode to a more abstract and taxonomic mode as a con-
sequence of schooling (see Tulviste,  1991 , for a replication of this study, 
carried out among the rural population of Kyrgyzstan). It has also been 
documented in the research of contemporary cognitive psychologists 
and cognitive anthropologists. Boivin ( 2008 ), for example, reported on 
a study that demonstrated the differential effects of subsistence culture 
on the psychology of time. The Muria Gonds, a rice-farming community of 
central India, have a highly structured and precise sense of time, which 
is conceptualized as a scarce resource. They pay close attention to the 
calendar, arranging social events years in advance and often refusing 
requests with the expression “I haven’t got time” (Boivin,  2008 , p. 56). 
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In contrast, members of the Umeda community of New Guinea, whose sub-
sistence depends largely on gathering sago fruit by roaming through the 
forest at irregular intervals, have a vague concept of time. Members of the 
community do not know how many months constitute a year and instead 
operate with two seasons: wet and dry (Boivin,  2008 , p. 57). 
 Another study implicating the social environment in cognition is a study 
by Evans and Schamberg ( 2009 ) on the effect of childhood poverty on 
working memory. Their research presented evidence that the chronic 
stress experienced by children raised in poverty resulted in the over-
production of the stress hormones epinephrine and cortisol, which in 
turn weakens the body’s immune system, with a deleterious effect on 
neural functioning, including working memory. The researchers argued 
that it should be possible to overcome the problem through specifi c 
training programs aimed at improving working memory. A study by Hol-
mes, Gathercole, and Dunning ( 2009 ), for instance, showed that it was 
indeed possible to improve the working memory of children and young 
adults who experience temporary emotional stress (e.g., the death of a 
loved one) through training. Casasanto’s ( 2011 ) research focused on 
the effect of bodily differences on thinking, an area that, as far as I know, 
Vygotsky and his colleagues did not explore in any detail but that certainly 
meshes with the tenets of the theory. Casasanto uncovered cognitive 
difference in the thinking of right- versus left-handers. For example, when 
presented with action verbs such as  grasp , right-handers process its 
meaning in the left hemisphere, which controls right-hand movements, 
whereas left-handers process these verbs in the right hemisphere, which 
controls their left-hand movements. Casasanto ( 2011 ) suggested that 
“people tend to understand verbs as referring to actions they would 
perform with their particular bodies . . . in this sense, people with 
different bodies understand the same verbs to mean something dif-
ferent” (p. 379). 
 Casasanto also reported that the meanings of cospeech gestures are 
different depending on handedness. For instance, right-handers tend to 
use left-hand gestures when verbally expressing negative emotions and 
tend to use right-hand gestures when using positive emotional language. 
Left-handers reverse things. Moreover, when forced to change handedness 
due to brain injury or when artifi cially handicapped in an experimental 
situation (e.g., wearing a bulky ski glove on the dominant hand during 
extended manual motor tasks) right-handers—the only ones participating 
in their study—manifested a shift to the left-handed bias of left-is-good. 
From this, Casasanto concluded that “motor experience plays a causal 
role in shaping abstract thoughts” (2011, p. 381). 
 Andy Clark ( 1998 ,  1999 ), following a line of reasoning that parallels 
Vygotsky’s (1978, p. 60), argued that the human brain evolved in such a 
way as to take advantage of the affordances provided by the environment 
to carry out cognitive processes. Using the parlance of contemporary 
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technology, A. Clark (1999, p. 349) refers to the bodily and environ-
mental components of thinking as “wideware.” The idea of wideware is 
that aspects of the social environment are necessary components of 
cognitive processing in a way that parallels how other species integrate 
aspects of the physical environment into their behavior. For instance, 
as A. Clark ( 1999 ) pointed out, given their physical attributes, bluefi n 
tuna should not be able to execute the sudden directional shifts and 
rapid acceleration in swimming speeds they are noted for. They are 
able to carry out these behaviors not because of their anatomical struc-
ture but because they have learned to exploit the vortices and 
changing currents of the ocean, and this enables them to perform swim-
ming behaviors that their bodies alone are incapable of. Hence, the 
bluefi n is not just a fi sh, but a “fi sh-as-embedded-in” its environment (A. 
Clark,  1999 , p. 345). Similarly, humans exploit their environment as 
“agents-operating-with-mediational-means” (Wertsch,  1998 , p. 24). For 
instance, to multiply large numbers (e.g., 3,454 × 9,759), most of us 
reach for pen and paper. As sociocultural artifacts, these tools allow us 
to reduce what would otherwise be a complex multiplication process to 
a series of simpler calculations (A. Clark,  1998 , p. 349). If the artifacts 
are withheld, most of us are at a loss to solve the problem (unless, 
of course, we have access to another human artifact, a calculator). The 
paper and pencil, therefore, are the wideware elements that allow 
humans to carry out a process that their brains, acting alone, would 
fi nd diffi cult, if not impossible, to complete. 
 With regard to language learning and teaching, we would expect that, 
under different social circumstances, language development would vary. 
On this view, learning a new language in educational settings would be a 
different cognitive process from learning the same language in immersion 
settings. In the former environment, properly organized instruction pro-
vokes rather than follows development and, as such, can be expected to 
result in different developmental routes than what has been documented 
among those who acquire language exclusively by immersion, in which 
they do not often receive systematic or well-organized mediation. We are 
currently assessing this hypothesis through comparison of the develop-
mental processes of learners in instructed settings with the fi ndings 
of research conducted under the umbrella of processability theory 
(Pienemann,  1998 ) and its related teachability hypothesis (Pienemann, 
 1984 ,  1987 ). Specifi cally, X. Zhang ( 2014 ) has demonstrated that a pedagog-
ical intervention designed according to sociocultural theory educational 
principles does alter the developmental path proposed by processability 
theory for topicalization in L2 Chinese (see Y. Zhang,  2001 ). 
 To echo and extend to sociocultural theory–SLA the sentiments 
expressed by Nick Ellis in his contribution to the present article: There 
is no gap. Building a bridge, therefore, is an unneeded act that would 
result in a bridge to nowhere. 
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 EPISTEMOLOGICAL REMARKS ON A SOCIAL-COGNITIVE GAP IN 
THE STUDY OF SECOND LANGUAGE LEARNING AND TEACHING 
 Jan H. Hulstijn 
 University of Amsterdam 
 As an observer of the discussions in the 2013 AAAL colloquium, it seemed 
to me that there appeared to be agreement on two points. First, there 
does not exist a gap between social and cognitive approaches to L2 
learning and teaching insofar as language learning is inherently social 
and, at the same time, all learning is cognitive by defi nition. There was, 
however, no agreement on the weight to be attributed to the social 
aspect of language learning. For instance, for Lantolf, who adopts a 
Vygotskian approach, the psyche is inherently social, and there is 
therefore no opposition between nature and nurture. Culture creates 
special forms of behavior, it modifi es the activity of mental functions, 
and it constructs new superstructures in the developing system of 
human behavior. For DeKeyser, however, this claim needs to be tested 
empirically (it must be falsifi ed or supported). Thus, whereas Lantolf 
emphasized the ontological status of Vygotsky’s theory, DeKeyser raised 
issues of an epistemological nature: How can we obtain supporting 
or confl icting evidence for Vygotsky’s theory, or indeed any theory? 
I return to this point later in this piece. 
 Second, speakers appeared to agree on the fact that scientifi c knowledge 
and the interpretation of the fi ndings of empirical research is collective 
in the sense that interpretations are shared by scholars united in what 
might be called a theory or a school—or what Fleck, in an important 
but relatively unknown book, called a thought collective, and which, 
some 30 years later, Kuhn called a paradigm (Fleck, 1935/1979; Kuhn, 
1962/1996). Whereas Young, in his contribution to the present article, 
elaborates on the social-cultural context of scientifi c knowledge in schools 
(or thought collectives), here I limit myself to proposing some herme-
neutic questions with which one may try to diagnose the nature of the 
gap, real or apparent, between scholars defending different theories. Do 
their theories belong to different, incommensurable schools, and, if so, 
what is the nature of the incommensurability? There may be several gaps 
in our fi eld, of which some might be bridged, whereas others cannot. An 
unbridgeable gap clearly exists between relativists and critical rational-
ists. As DeKeyser put it, does an acknowledgement of the social-cultural 
context of scientifi c knowledge stand in the way of hypothesis testing, 
seeking generalizable knowledge, and evaluating theories? DeKeyser 
pointed out that there is a difference between acknowledging that all sci-
entifi c knowledge is embedded in a social-cultural context and claiming 
that all scientifi c knowledge is relative; a scholar can agree with the fi rst 
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statement but assume at the same time that there is a best truth that we 
can fi nd at this point and that it is the scholar’s task to uncover that truth. 
 Although I place myself in the camp of Popperian critical rationalism 
(Hulstijn,  2013 ; Jordan,  2004 ), the AAAL colloquium left me in a state of 
confusion with respect to the question of how to conceptualize differ-
ences among applied linguists and SLA researchers in terms of their 
theories and their epistemological stances. To help myself, and hopefully 
to help others too, I have listed in the subsequent sections a number of 
considerations and evaluation criteria instrumental in making sense 
of differences in theories and their epistemological stances. Though 
some may consider these criteria biased in favor of critical rationalism, 
I offer them in the spirit of promoting better understanding across epis-
temological lines. 
 GUIDELINES FOR DIAGNOSING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 
THEORIES 
 In trying to make sense of what appear as different theories, approaches, 
frameworks, or models espoused by individual scholars, it might be 
useful to ask the following questions. 
 Epistemology 
 Are we dealing with differences with respect to epistemology? Is one 
scholar perhaps a relativist, and does the other perhaps subscribe 
to Popper’s ( 1959 ) critical rationalism? In this case, the gap cannot be 
bridged. These epistemological stances are incommensurable. Note 
that this epistemological divide does not necessarily run along the 
borders between Vygotskian and non-Vygotskian approaches, between 
social and cognitive theories, or between qualitative and quantitative 
methods in applied linguistics. 
 Theoretical Constructs 
 Are theoretical constructs proposed as requiring bottom-up empirical 
evidence for their existence (“research-then-theory”), or are they pro-
posed as not in need of direct empirical support (“theory-then-testing”; 
Jordan,  2004 , p. 46)? To give an example from linguistics, whereas most 
pre-Chomskyan structuralists adopted the bottom-up stance, linguists 
working in the generative school work from the top down. The abstract 
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constructs in a structuralist theory rest inductively on empirical evidence. 
A good example is the phoneme construct. A structuralist theory offers 
empirical means to determine whether or not a sound-like phenomenon 
is assigned the status of phoneme. By contrast, a theory, viable in the 
generative school of linguistics, may consist of many unobservable 
abstract constructs, as long as hypotheses can be derived from a theory 
that can be empirically tested (supported or falsifi ed). In the top-down 
approach, testing theory-driven hypotheses is the way to accept or reject 
a construct in the theory’s attempt to explain a phenomenon. 
 Object of Inquiry 
 Do the two theories try to solve the same problem? Do they have the 
same object of inquiry? For instance, a theory that attempts to under-
stand the behavior of students and teachers in L2 classrooms cannot be 
directly compared with a theory that attempts to address the so-called 
learnability question in the fi eld of SLA (briefl y: Why do L2 learners pro-
duce grammatical utterances that they have never heard or seen?). 
Note that two scholars can, but need not, differ both in the objects of 
their theories and in their epistemological stances. 
 Assumptions 
 Is it possible to distinguish, in each scholar’s theory, between (a) the 
fundamental part that is not proposed as testable (the theory’s assump-
tions or postulates) and (b) the part that is proposed as testable—that 
is, the part from which testable hypotheses can be derived? Although 
differences in (b) can, in principle, be settled by empirical research, 
differences in (a) cannot be settled on rational grounds, and, in this case, 
we can speak of an unbridgeable gap. Broadly speaking, most (perhaps 
all?) theories consist of two parts. The fi rst part is their conceptual basis, 
comprising a number of assumptions that in and of themselves are not 
proposed as being falsifi able. Built on this conceptual basis, the theo-
ry’s second part consists of an explanation that is proposed as testable. 
For instance, researchers working in the generative framework assume 
that both L1 learners and L2 learners acquire abstract properties of the 
target language that are underdetermined by the input. Thus, the input 
is insuffi cient for the acquisition of such properties. This assumption forms 
the basis for explaining the acquisition of, for example,  wh -movement by 
L1 and L2 learners of English (White,  2007 ). The assumption of underde-
termination (known as  poverty of the stimulus ) cannot be falsifi ed within 
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generative linguistics itself. If one does not want to accept this as-
sumption, one has to construct another theory with other assumptions. 
For instance, emergentist theories of language acquisition do not as-
sume that L1 and L2 acquisition are constrained by abstract linguistic 
knowledge. Instead, they assume that the input does suffi ce for both 
L1 and L2 acquisition by postulating general learning principles not 
specifi c to language learning. 
 Having made this distinction between a theory’s assumptions and claims 
derived from it, I should perhaps add that it is possible for a theory to 
include no claims (or hardly any) proposed for empirical investigation. 
Such a theory thus mainly consists of a set of views, and, for critical 
rationalists, this would hardly qualify as a theory because, for them, 
falsifi cation of testable claims is the hallmark of inquiry. If I understand 
Lantolf’s position correctly, the materialist approach to psychology in 
Vygotsky’s theory is proposed as a postulate that cannot be tested 
within the theory. However, Lantolf also formulates a claim derived 
from the theory—namely, that changes in sociocultural circumstances 
are likely to bring about changes in psychological processing. He cites 
a study in progress to test alternative claims with respect to processes 
of second language development, emanating from sociocultural theory 
and processability theory (Pienemann,  1998 ). 
 Note, furthermore, that two theories that rule each other out in terms 
of assumptions or claims cannot both be correct. Thus even a relativist 
could not say that, whereas the generativists are right in postulating 
that L1 and L2 learning are constrained by highly abstract linguistic 
preknowledge, emergentists are right in solely postulating general 
learning principles not specifi c for language learning. 
 At this point, I should note that, in the previous paragraphs, I have 
used the term  school (paradigm) in two ways, which is potentially 
confusing. First, I placed theories adopting different stances to epis-
temology (e.g., bottom-up vs. top-down views on theoretical con-
structs, or relativism vs. postpositivist rationalism) in different schools. 
But I also placed in different schools theories differing in terms of 
the nontestable assumptions with respect to the phenomena to be 
explained or understood. In the case of structuralist and generative 
linguistics, I believe we are dealing with schools that differ both in 
epistemology and in terms of assumptions. That is, the structuralist 
and generative schools hold, respectively, bottom-up and top-down 
views on the status of theoretical constructs, and, respectively, they 
deny and accept the necessity of testing theory-driven hypotheses. 
In terms of their respective assumptions, they do not (structuralist) or 
do (generative) hold assumptions concerning the so-called black box of 
the human mind. But in the case of generative linguistics and emer-
gentism, I believe we are dealing with two schools adopting the same 
epistemological stance toward theoretical constructs and the necessity 
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of theory testing, but we are taking different positions with respect to 
some fundamental ontological assumptions concerning language acquisi-
tion. That is, whereas generative linguistics and emergentism both allow 
abstract constructs not based on observable phenomena as long as test-
able hypotheses can be derived from the theory, the generative school 
explains language acquisition with the assumed existence of a language 
faculty, and the emergentist school assumes that language acquisition 
can be explained solely with a general cognitive learning device. 
 ADDITIONAL CRITERIA 
 Given two theories that appear to address the same question and after 
having answered the four questions just discussed, one might subse-
quently profi t from the following criteria, proposed by Kuhn ( 1977 ), 
who thereby demonstrated that he was not an extreme relativist, as 
some of his critics have argued (see Jordan,  2004 , p. 51). I render the 
criteria in my own words:
  
 •  Coherence. How coherent are the theories? Are their constructs clearly 
defi ned, and is their formulation consistent? 
 •  Testability. To what extent are the theories testable? What is the empirical 
evidence for the theories? 
 •  Scope. What is the scope of the theories? That is, which and how many 
phenomena can they account for (beyond the question that they both 
address)? 
 •  Fruitfulness. How (potentially) fruitful are the theories? Do they open avenues 
for new insights and new research? 
 •  Simplicity. How simple are the theories? If the two theories score equally well 
on the other four criteria, can we then, for reasons of economy, select the one 
with fewer constructs? 
  
 I acknowledge that, for extreme relativists (including postmodernists 
and constructivists; see Jordan,  2004 , Chapter 3), these fi ve criteria for 
the evaluation of competing theories are unacceptable because of their 
intellectual origins in Popperian critical rationalism. In their view, critical 
rationalism should not be applied—at least not wholesale—to applied 
linguistics in general or to sociocultural issues in L2 learning and 
teaching and language education in particular. 
 CONCLUDING REMARK 
 This brings me back to what I see as an almost impossible job of playing 
the role of a commentator in a more neutral way, with the intention 
to seek bridges, while, at the same time, embracing Popper’s ( 1959 ) 
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philosophy of critical rationalism. When I compare the debate and 
personal communications during and after the colloquium with the 
relativist-rationalist debate in the 1990s (e.g., with Block,  1996 , in one 
camp, and Gregg, Long, Jordan, & Beretta,  1997 , in the other—for more 
references to this debate, see Jordan,  2004 , pp. 1–3), it occurs to me that 
there are two differences between then and now that give reason for 
optimism. First, as I tried to argue with my diagnostic questions, there is 
no single social-cognitive gap in L2 learning and teaching research: Differ-
ences in stance may be a matter of epistemology (extreme relativists vs. 
extreme rationalists), but they may alternatively constitute a matter of 
ontology (the part of the theory that is proposed as untestable). Second, 
there appears to be a willingness to listen to voices from the other side 
and to enter into a dialogue not characterized by acrimony. 
 Part 2: Data and Research Methods 
 EXPLORING QUESTIONS OF BALANCE IN INTERACTION 
RESEARCH 
 Alison Mackey 
 Georgetown University and Lancaster University 
 In the 2013 AAAL colloquium and in my contribution to this article, I was 
asked to address the following questions: What are the methods of inquiry 
that you prefer in your own work, what do you see as their weaknesses 
or limitations, and what attracts you in other methodologies? I have 
chosen to address these issues by discussing work within the interac-
tion approach to SLA. In particular, I focus on how that approach is 
currently evolving to include a social dimension and how typical methods 
of inquiry associated with it are expanding in parallel. I have titled my 
contribution “Exploring Questions of Balance” for reasons I hope will 
soon become obvious. 
 In the initial version of the interaction hypothesis, meaningful interac-
tion, corrective feedback, and associated interactional features were 
thought to be associated with attention, in a process involving intake and 
driving L2 learning. However, in the original formulation of the hypothesis 
and until recently, there were relatively few concrete statements or claims 
in relation to the social factors that underlie interaction. In the last few 
years, a reenvisioned and current version of the interaction approach 
has begun to take off (see, e.g., Mackey,  2012 ). In general, interaction 
researchers are now taking a more cyclical view, as DeKeyser has noted 
in his contribution to this article. Qualitative research often provides 
insights into social factors such as those mentioned by Young in his 
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contribution to this article, and it is then sometimes followed up by 
quantitative research. This is essentially the same process that occurs 
when controlled and balanced laboratory research uncovers constructs 
that can then be explored in classrooms and possibly applied (with cau-
tion, as Lightbown,  2000 , has reminded us) in authentic instructed set-
tings. Keeping this cycle in mind is one of the issues of balance. We need 
to carefully weigh the cognitive, the social, the laboratory, and the 
classroom, bearing in mind the goals of the research. It is also impor-
tant to consider pace, because research needs to progress at a rate at 
which the expansion of inquiry evolves at a comfortable speed. In other 
words, we need to recognize the value of different approaches, both in 
their own right and also for what they can provide. It is not practical 
and should not be necessary for those interactionists beginning to con-
sider social variables to completely shift their methodological tools and 
paradigms. Although progress is inevitable as we work to continue to 
address interesting questions and to elicit valid data, these develop-
ments should build on a strong foundation, and we must recognize that 
the  process of evolution is important. 
 The progression to include social variables can be seen in other work 
related to interaction research. For example, in relation to Robinson’s 
( 2001 ) cognition hypothesis and task complexity, recent work reported 
by Révész and Gilabert ( 2013 ) described methodological advances in 
task research illustrating the same trend that we are also privy to in the 
interaction and feedback area—namely, a primarily cognitive orientation 
beginning to be infl uenced by social concerns. Révész and Gilabert, for 
example, looked at learners’ perceptions of diffi culty and mental effort, 
supplementing external theories and claims about diffi culty by triangu-
lating data from the learners’ perspectives. It is a short next step for 
research like this to examine a range of factors that may impact how 
learners respond to these sorts of questions, and it would seem to be a 
logical next step from looking at what learners believe about diffi culty 
to asking what contributes to those beliefs. 
 The realization that considering social and contextual factors pro-
vides interesting primary and supplementary data can also be seen in 
work that looks outside the head of the individual and unpacks what a 
“task” means to an individual learner or pair. For example, Young’s ( 2009 ) 
work recognizes that what he calls discursive practices—essentially 
communicative tasks—have a history, and he observes that we need to 
understand what learners do in any one task by also looking at the var-
ious aspects of their history with that task and what it means for them. 
 In other words, as the interaction hypothesis and task-based approaches 
to learning continue to evolve, it seems logical to me that those taking a 
more cognitive approach and those taking a more social approach will 
benefi t from working together. This is another one of the questions of 
balance I want to raise. We need to ask one another, and ourselves, how 
Jan H. Hulstijn et al.382
we can benefi t from combining our perspectives. It is clear how fruitful 
cognitive research and social research are on their own, as other con-
tributions to this article demonstrate. I suggest that we need to ask 
questions like the following: What can we gain? How can cognitively 
oriented research most productively include socially oriented method-
ologies and vice versa? What are the challenges in doing this? How do 
we go about creating research questions that do not all suppose a priori 
constructs? And how do we adopt new methods, adapt current methods, 
and combine methods? I suggest that, to do this most effectively, collab-
oration is an essential requirement. 
 In a study I carried out with Jenefer Philp, published in 2010 in 
a book edited by Rob Batstone, we saw how relationships among 
learners impacted what they were willing and able to listen to and 
attend to in interaction and how this impacted what they produced. 
Because input and output were clearly equated with learning for us 
as interaction researchers, we realized that we needed to recognize 
what creates conditions for what we think of as successful input and 
output. This led us to think about methodologies for investigating 
social concerns. 
 What the Philp and Mackey ( 2010 ) study led me to believe is that my own 
perspective has evolved and now falls somewhere between quantitative 
and qualitative and between a primarily cognitive and a primarily social 
approach. This led me to ask how researchers from each perspective 
do what the other party is trained to do when (a) we do not have the 
skill set in methodology and (b) we are not fully confi dent in the frame-
work. These issues are taken up much more eloquently by Martha Big-
elow in her contribution to this article. As an example of the need for 
caution when examining questions of balance, our fi eld does sometimes 
see criticisms of mixed methods as well as objections when someone 
like me, who has traditionally taken a primarily cognitive approach, 
takes a mixed-methods approach. It is obviously a legitimate concern to 
suggest that tacking a minor case study of one or two learners onto the 
end of a primarily cognitive, quantitative study is not suffi cient to allow 
us to think of our approach as authentically socially informed. I do not 
intend this to be an argument against mixed-methods research, although 
I do suggest that it might be short sighted for social researchers to call for 
cognitive researchers to examine social factors without acknowledging 
that there may be benefi ts to their own research of taking cognitive 
factors into perspective. The problem is, once again, one of training, of 
time, and of expertise. Again, I believe one way to address this is through 
collaboration and teamwork. 
 Simply associating cognitive with quantitative and social with qualita-
tive is overly simplistic (a point also made in a much clearer way by 
Talmy in his contribution to this article). Some modes of inquiry are 
associated with both and some with only one. Some of the constructs 
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that we may consider socially informed, or at least useful for broadening 
the horizons of traditionally cognitive work—for example, motivation, 
willingness to communicate, or introspective measures—are psycholog-
ical constructs and methods that have been included in research on 
language learning and teaching since the inception of the fi eld. We need 
to recognize that, just as we read in research methods books, there is 
no clear dichotomy between quantitative and qualitative, and our famil-
iarity with paradigms similarly operates on a continuum. 
 I also believe that being open to new methodologies for inquiry, as 
I optimistically think we have traditionally tended to be in L2 learning 
and teaching research, may guard us from entrenchment in theoretical 
approaches and from oppositional positions. Indeed, data obtained 
through stimulated recall protocols—elicitation techniques that were 
originally employed in interaction work simply to shed light on learners’ 
cognitive processes (Gass & Mackey,  2000 )—were what eventually 
convinced me that social factors are an important force in cognitive-
interaction research. 
 In summary, then, it is my belief that we need, as Rod Ellis ( 2010 ) has 
put it, to go beyond the psycholinguistic rationale in the interaction 
approach. However—and this is again related to balance—let’s not 
throw the baby out with the bathwater. I vote for augmenting and devel-
oping the interaction hypothesis and working together with those who 
take a primarily social approach. Together, I think we can achieve the 
best outcome. By this, I mean research partnerships of paradigms and 
methods. Social factors underlie the nature of learners’ participation 
in interaction and, therefore, will logically impact learning opportu-
nities through interaction. 
 TOWARD AN INTERPRETIVIST TURN IN L2 STUDIES 
 Refl exivity, the Cognitive-Social Divide, and Beyond 
 Steven Talmy 
 University of British Columbia 
 In my contribution to the 2013 AAAL colloquium and to this article,  3  
I make a brief case for an interpretivist turn in L2 studies, predicated on 
the belief that if the fi eld has made a social turn—or, for that matter, a 
discursive turn, a narrative turn, a multilingual turn, a critical turn, and so 
on (Pennycook,  2010 )—then the frameworks of inquiry that we deploy 
need a similar turn to help us account for them. A good candidate for 
such an accounting is interpretivism (e.g., see Howe,  2003 ,  2004 ). I begin 
by quoting from the abstract to the 2013 AAAL colloquium:
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 The fi eld of applied linguistics runs the risk of disintegrating into two 
irreconcilable approaches to language learning and use. On the one 
side, we fi nd researchers investigating linguistic-cognitive issues, often 
using quantitative research methods including inferential statistics; on 
the other side we fi nd researchers working on the basis of sociocul-
tural or socio-cognitive views, often using qualitative research methods 
including case studies, ethnography, and often taking a critical stance. 
This colloquium focuses on the question whether both sides might ben-
efi t from using insights and methods from one another. The colloquium’s 
premise is that, on each side, there are researchers who have become 
aware of the limitations of their own approach and who are looking for 
possibilities to enrich their theories and research methods in order 
to attain more complete answers to the questions that they seek to 
answer. 
 The colloquium brings together researchers from both sides who share 
the concerns expressed above and who are willing to enter into dialogue 
with the other side. 
 There are several important assumptions in this abstract that raise 
many important questions, only a few of which I have space to consider 
here. What follows is not meant as criticism, for surely the assumptions 
I address are prevalent throughout L2 studies. Its purpose is, instead, to 
provide a context for the discussion that I undertake in the second half 
of my contribution. 
 QUESTION 1. ARE WE BRIDGING DIVISIONS OR (RE)CREATING 
THEM? 
 This question concerns the premise of the colloquium itself, specifi cally 
the binarisms that it denotes and connotes—cognitive-social, quantitative-
qualitative, experimental-naturalistic . . . and why stop there: neutral-
political, conservative-progressive, right-wrong. It is hardly an original 
insight to note that binarisms like these are reductive and fail to capture 
the kinds of complex inquiries often undertaken in their name. It is worth 
asking if we might be reifying and reproducing the very divisions the 
colloquium is predicated on bridging. Moreover, are the distinctions 
between them as stark as we make them out to be (Allwood,  2012 )? Who 
profi ts from them? Do we need to  bridge divides or  dissolve them by 
interrogating (how we participate in) their construction and by commit-
ting to metatheoretical dialogue with colleagues on other coastlines? 
 I would like to extend this question to the participation structure that 
was adopted for the colloquium in Dallas: that of debate. Debates cannot 
be construed as entering into dialogue. Rather, debates yield the sorts 
of  displacive discourse that Julian Edge ( 2004 ) has written of (also see 
Tompkins,  1988 ), the stuff of the so-called paradigm wars of the 1970s 
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and 1980s, and, closer to home, in L2 studies, of the 1990s. Have those 
zero-sum, scorched-earth disputes (of many examples, see Beretta, 
Crookes, Gregg, & Long’s,  1994 , “response” to van Lier,  1994 ) taught 
us nothing? 
 QUESTION 2. QUANTITATIVE : COGNITIVE :: QUALITATIVE : 
SOCIAL? 
 Relatedly, in arguing for an enrichment of research that engages with 
diverse theoretical orientations, we could also ask if we are working 
from a premise in which cognitive is mapped to quantitative and social 
to qualitative. Obviously, there is substantial quantitative research that 
adopts an explicitly social orientation, just as there is qualitative research 
that examines cognition. Why not historicize and contextualize our dis-
cussion here in those diverse and robust literatures? 
 QUESTION 3. SAME TERMS, DIFFERENT MEANINGS? 
 And this brings to mind another question: Do we share similar con-
ceptual vocabularies? Though the terms may be the same— cognition , 
 social ,  research ,  learning ,  bilingual —even the putative learning object, 
the L2, can mean very different things to those working from, say, posi-
tions informed by cognitive psychology or linguistic anthropology, 
sociology or social psychology, and discursive psychology or linguis-
tics. This is as it should be for a fi eld as increasingly transdisciplinary 
as L2 studies; nonetheless, it is worth asking if we are playing the same 
 language-game (Wittgenstein, 1953/2001) and, if we can acknowledge 
that we are not, then asking if there is some way we might contend 
with that. 
 QUESTION 4. METHODOLOGY OR METHODOLATRY? 
 Finally, I was asked to focus my discussion on research methods, 
specifi cally, “the methods of inquiry that [I] prefer in [my] own work, . . . 
their . . . limitations, and what attracts [me to] other methodologies.” 
But I cannot do this absent an actual study and research purpose. I have 
conducted critical discourse analyses, critical ethnography, and inter-
view studies, but, in doing so, I have used methods not necessarily 
associated with these traditions, not because I preferred these methods 
in the abstract but because they were best suited for the particular 
research project and research questions I had formulated. So I wonder, is 
it in our interest to discuss method in the abstract? Might a preference 
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for quantitative methods, or qualitative methods, or, more likely for the 
purposes of “bridging gaps,” mixed-methods research be putting the 
cart before the horse? What if we turn our attention to the particular-
ities of our research projects, research questions, and theories and 
then, in the context of such particularity, formulate our methodology 
and, in so doing, occupy ourselves not with “methodolatry” (Janesick, 
 1994 ) but with epistemology and ontology (Pascale,  2011 )? Because it is 
in the areas of epistemology and ontology—not method—that I believe 
our attention ought to be. And this leads me to the main part of this 
contribution. 
 AN INTERPRETIVIST TURN IN L2 INQUIRY 
 The engagement with ontology and epistemology that I am talking about 
in terms of method might be called—in its strong version, at least—
an  interpretivist turn and—in a less strong version, perhaps—a  refl exive 
turn . Regardless of label, such a turn would be suitably rigorous, refl ex-
ive, and responsive to diverse theoretical positions and conceptions of 
language and learning, cognition, the social, and so on (see Sfard,  1998 ). 
It would embrace methodological and paradigmatic pluralism and 
hybridity, diverse “styles of inquiry” (Pascale,  2011 , p. 141), similar 
to Howe’s ( 2003 ,  2004 ,  2012 ) notion of  mixed-methods interpretivism , a 
metaparadigmatic move that, when taken, immediately recognizes that 
paradigms are themselves interpretive frameworks and, thus, that sees 
all social science research—quantitative, qualitative, and mixed-methods 
research—for what it is: the outcome of the interpretive activity of 
particular people working from particular disciplinary and theoret-
ical orientations in particular social contexts and historical moments 
(Giddens,  1976 ). 
 From such a perspective, differing paradigmatic positions and theoret-
ical orientations come to offer  different rather than  competing perspec-
tives on an object of study—different rather than competing conceptions 
of what that object might be. Those differences can then be engaged at 
metaparadigmatic, metamethodological, and metatheoretical levels in 
ways that refl exively reveal the contours and boundaries of knowledge 
production and that demonstrate how our conceptions about and our 
study of a particular phenomenon are inevitably perspectival, as we 
ourselves as researchers are inevitably implicated in how we come to 
know and speak of what we study. In short, an interpretivist turn would 
compel us to avoid the “god trick” that Haraway ( 1988 ) has described. 
It would oblige us to acknowledge that research is the outcome of our 
participation in particular social practices, practices that are as diverse 
as they are generically identifi able, disciplinarily and theoretically 
informed, historically specifi c, and paradigmatically sited. 
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 Of the potential ways forward in such an interpretivist turn, one may 
be with Howe’s mixed-methods interpretivism (mentioned previously). 
Another could be Alvesson and Skoldberg’s ( 2009 ) refl exive methodology, 
which I briefl y sketch next. 
 REFLEXIVE METHODOLOGY FOR AN INTERPRETIVIST TURN 
 Refl exive methodology is characterized by careful, rigorous interpreta-
tion and a sustained, thoroughgoing refl exivity. Interpretation “implies 
that all references . . . to empirical data are the results of interpretation. 
Thus the idea that measurements, observations, the statements of 
interview subjects . . . the study of . . . statistics or archival data [in 
some way refl ect or mirror reality] is rejected on principle” (Alvesson & 
Skoldberg,  2009 , p. 9). Methods are selected not in the abstract but 
always in relation to specifi c research problems and research objects 
(p. 8). This is not to say that inquiry proceeds without criteria for high 
quality: Rigor counts, certainly, but there is a shift from searching for 
“truth” to developing well-warranted, defensible claims based on empir-
ical data, which at the same time are acknowledged to be the outcome 
of the researcher’s analytic activity. 
 The possibilities of, and dimensions for, high-quality research are fur-
ther enhanced by  refl exivity . But this form of refl exivity does not remain 
at the level of method; it is “the launching of a critical self-exploration of 
one’s own interpretations of empirical material” (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 
 2009 , p. 9). It is a “problematizing practice” (Pennycook,  2001 , pp. 41–45) 
that includes consideration of the inherent value-laden-ness of research 
and of representational politics (Giroux,  1992 ). These interpretations 
of the interpretation can then be considered for their epistemological 
and ontological assumptions, for what they offer, for what they do not 
offer, and for points of contact and commonalities as well as diver-
gences and disjunctures between alternative interpretive frames. With 
such refl exivity, “the center of gravity is shifted from the handling of 
empirical material towards . . . a consideration of the perceptual, 
cognitive, theoretical, linguistic, (inter)textual, political and cultural 
circumstances that form the backdrop to—as well as [infuse]—the 
interpretations” (Alvesson & Skoldberg,  2009 , p. 9; also see Giddens, 
 1976 ; Pascale,  2011 ). 
 CONCLUSION 
 An interpretivist turn essentially engages Giddens’s ( 1976 ) notion of the 
double hermeneutic. As Giddens observed, social scientifi c research 
stands in a “subject-subject relation” to its object of inquiry (contra a 
Jan H. Hulstijn et al.388
“subject-object” relation in the natural sciences); that is, it is embedded 
in its subject matter: human society (pp. 146–147). Thus, “the creation 
and reproduction of meaning-frames [i.e., paradigms] is a very condi-
tion of that which it seeks to analyse” (Giddens,  1976 , p. 158). An inter-
pretivist turn compels a discursive space in which the explicit mediation 
of such “meaning-frames” can occur. This provides opportunities to 
engage with issues of ontology and epistemology that are sidestepped 
at the level of method. It turns theory and method “back on itself” to 
consider how researchers’ “location carries privileges and secures par-
ticular forms of authority . . . [regarding] who speaks, under what condi-
tions, and for whom” (Giroux,  1992 , p. 222). This applies to epistemologies 
and paradigms that are well represented in research in language learning 
and teaching as well as to ones that, unfortunately, are not (e.g., indige-
nous, feminist, critical, Queer, postcolonial, postmodern, Green, and 
more), thus offering additionally intriguing possibilities for the sort of 
interpretive turn that I am suggesting. From such a position, it is acknowl-
edged that there are multiple—not just two—ways of seeing, knowing, 
and understanding the world and of conceptualizing, researching, and 
representing phenomena. From such a position, rather than arguing ad 
nauseam over who is right and who is wrong (i.e., “the ding-dong of point-
scoring that sometimes accompanies, and sometimes masquerades 
as, academic debate” [Edge,  2004 , p. 718]), we see what one perspec-
tive offers in terms of another, what that other offers in terms of the 
former, how they diverge, how they may converge, and so on, and we 
engage  that . 
 In sum, the sort of interpretivist turn that I am suggesting is predicated 
on refl exivity, a refl exivity that extends beyond method to paradigm. In 
this view, one’s paradigmatic commitments, whatever they are, can be 
maintained, but they are made explicit and are addressed, discussed, 
compared, and contrasted in a language game that all L2 researchers 
play, one that centrally concerns epistemology and ontology. An inter-
pretivist turn grounded in such a thoroughgoing refl exivity is one way 
I believe that a generative, shared understanding across paradigms in 
L2 studies might be attempted. Contributors to this article (especially 
Mackey and Bigelow) offer examples of precisely the sorts of refl exivity 
that I am proposing and the advantages that can derive from it. 
 Finally, the colloquium has made me aware that if there is any “gap” 
in L2 studies, it concerns a general lack of consistent consideration 
among L2 scholars of matters in the philosophy of science, the anthro-
pology of science, and the sociology of scientifi c knowledge. We would 
do well to create in our studies, our professional journals, our graduate 
courses, our graduate programs, and our conferences (!) the space for 
these sorts of discussions to occur (no mean feat, I know, given ever-
tightening page restrictions, journals contending with voluminous numbers 
of submissions, and courses with already overstuffed syllabi). The study 
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of learning, teaching, and the use of L2s has surely reached a point at 
which sustained and substantive attention to such issues is overdue. 
 METHODS AND DATA 
 Tangled Up in Blue 
 Richard F. Young 
 University of Wisconsin-Madison 
 RESEARCH IN L2 LEARNING AND TEACHING AS A COLLECTIVE 
ACTIVITY 
 In conceiving the 2013 AAAL colloquium, Hulstijn and I were inspired by 
an idea, originally proposed by Ludwik Fleck (see Sady,  2012 ), that what 
members of a research community know about their fi eld is, in fact, a 
collective social activity. If we extend Fleck’s (1935/1979) ideas to L2 
studies, it becomes clear that, when individuals do research in language 
learning and teaching, when instructors teach SLA, and when teachers 
relate research to the classroom, they are part of a community of persons 
mutually exchanging ideas and maintaining intellectual interaction, a 
community Fleck called a  thought collective . Our understandings of the 
diverse phenomena of L2 learning and teaching is a product of that 
collective activity—a  thought style —within the thought collective, or a 
“picture, which is visible only to anybody who takes part in this social 
activity, or a thought which is also clear to members of the collective 
only” (Cohen & Schnelle,  1985 , p. 77). 
 In fearing that research in L2 learning and teaching runs the risk of 
disintegrating into two irreconcilable approaches to language learning 
and language use, Hulstijn and I were echoing another of Fleck’s 
(1935/1979) notions: the incommensurability of thought styles, a notion 
that underlies the far better known work of Kuhn (1962/1996). The in-
commensurability that we perceived between researchers investigating 
linguistic-cognitive issues and those working on the basis of sociocultural 
or sociocognitive views of research in L2 learning and teaching is rec-
ognized by Fleck as three differences in thought style. First, echoing 
Wittgenstein’s (1953/2001) concept of the  language-game , Fleck recognized 
that the language used by members of a thought collective to describe 
what appears to them as reality differs from one thought collective 
to another. For example, the term  L2 learning has different meanings 
according to whether researchers consider learning as the incremental 
accumulation of concepts that are gradually refi ned and combined with 
other concepts to form cognitive structures or, alternatively, whether 
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they consider learning as movement along trajectories of changing 
engagement in discursive practices. Second, the questions that members 
of a thought collective ask arise from within the thought collective; in 
other words, the phenomena to which members of a thought collective 
attend are constructs of their thought style. For example, in analyzing a 
conversation between two people, Mackey has written in her contribution 
to this article that researchers working with the initial version of the 
interaction approach focused their attention on meaningful interaction, 
corrective feedback, and associated interactional features. Working 
within a different thought collective, although researchers may recog-
nize the importance of interactional modifi cations, they may choose 
instead to attend to very different features, including the gender, eth-
nicity, and age of the participants as well as how power is exercised and 
resisted in interaction. The third characteristic of incommensurable 
thought styles, according to Fleck, is a difference in perceptions: What 
researchers within one thought style see, people working within a 
different thought style do not see, and thus they think differently about 
phenomena. As Fleck (1935/1979) wrote:
 The principles of [a different thought collective] are, if noticed at all, felt 
to be arbitrary and their possible legitimacy as begging the question. The 
alien way of thought seems like mysticism. The questions it rejects will 
often be regarded as the most important ones, its explanations as proving 
nothing or as missing the point, its problems as often unimportant or 
meaningless trivialities. (p. 109) 
 In L2 learning and teaching research, though researchers in different 
thought collectives study the same phenomenon—what Cook and Bassetti 
( 2011 ) term  bilingual cognition —some see it as neural activation at the 
interface between the cortex and the limbic system, whereas others see 
the genesis of cognition in cultural artifacts, social interaction, and the 
socioeconomic environment of individuals. Within these different thought 
collectives, different thought styles envisage the nature of bilingual cog-
nition in their own and very different ways. 
 METHODS AND METHODOLATRY 
 A similar understanding of the history of ideas has been put forward by 
Talmy. In his contribution to this article, Talmy questions whether, in 
recognizing differences and even incommensurabilities between thought 
styles, we are not creating discursive space through a rhetoric of differ-
ence. Some of that difference may be attributed to the different methods 
researchers in L2 learning and teaching employ, methods that become 
ingrained within one thought collective but are considered esoteric 
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and misunderstood by researchers in a different thought collective. 
A noticeable difference between thought styles was presented by Talmy, 
who recognized that, within a cognitive thought community, quantita-
tive research is the predominant thought style, whereas researchers 
in a social thought community adopt a predominantly qualitative 
thought style. Indeed, after many years of teaching a graduate course 
in research methods, I have found that qualitative research methods 
including case study, ethnography, grounded theory, and narrative 
inquiry appeal to students with undergraduate majors in the human-
ities, whereas numerical methods involving statistical analyses of data 
from surveys, experiments, and language corpora appeal to students 
with a background in sociology or psychology. So, yes, in these student 
preferences I recognize a rhetoric of difference between qualitative and 
quantitative research methods, what Janesick ( 2011 ) called different 
 habits of mind , grounded in the personal preferences of researchers and 
the early training they received. 
 Do such differences of method lead to irreconcilable differences in 
understanding the phenomena of language learning and use? There are 
two cases showing that differences may in fact be reconcilable, and the 
choice of one method may lead to insights that can then be best studied 
by a different method. In one case, insights from qualitative research 
may lead to investigations best undertaken through quantitative com-
parisons. An example of this comes from the results of conversation 
analysis applied to crosslinguistic comparisons. Conversation analysts, 
as Schegloff ( 1993 ) argued, have eschewed quantitative analysis in the 
belief that when analysts count, they are not counting instances of what 
to the participants are necessarily the same thing. Fox et al. ( 2009 ), 
while accepting that, in same-turn self-repair, speakers are not always 
doing the same thing, chose to investigate the site where speakers 
initiate repair within the same turn. They then compared the sites at 
which speakers preferred to initiate same-turn self-repair across seven 
different languages. By means of quantitative comparisons across the 
seven languages, Fox and colleagues found that the sites favoring self-
repair initiation within the same turn in the different languages depend 
to a large extent on the syllabic and morphemic properties of words in 
the language. 
 A second example of reconciling separate thought styles illustrates 
how a quantitative analysis may reveal broad connections between 
variables while, at the same time, identifying outliers whose atypical 
performance merits further investigation. An example of just such a 
quantitative study is Abrahamsson and Hyltenstam ( 2008 )’s study of 
the relationship between language learning aptitude in adults and chil-
dren and their eventual nativelikeness. Abrahamsson and Hyltenstam 
confi rmed a correlation between quantitative measures of aptitude and 
nativelikeness (stronger in adults but weaker in children), but their 
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analysis also revealed that the rare nativelike adults all turned out to be 
exceptionally talented language learners whose unusual ability is worth 
investigating further by qualitative means. 
 We can perhaps conclude, then, that although cognitive research is 
predominantly quantitative, whereas qualitative methods prevail in 
social research, neither quantitative nor qualitative research methods 
should be taken as unquestioned thought styles within their respective 
thought collectives. Both quantitative cognitive research and qualita-
tive social research may produce results best investigated with a dif-
ferent methodology. In other words, as Talmy has argued, we should be 
careful that our own training and formative experiences as researchers 
do not lead to a habitual attachment to a single habit of mind resulting 
in methodolatry. 
 HOW DO WE KNOW WHAT WE KNOW? 
 If the association between thought style and thought collective is 
strong, then we can ask if one way to bridge the gap between social and 
cognitive approaches is for researchers in L2 learning and teaching in 
each thought collective to adopt different research methods (i.e., dif-
ferent thought styles). If the question of methodology is essentially 
“How do we know what we know?” then if we change  how we know, does 
that alter  what we know? In Lantolf’s contribution to this article, he has 
proposed that the knowing-how question (a question of epistemology) 
is not much of a question; instead he asks us fi rst to settle what he calls 
the “ontological problem”—the question of what human cognition is. 
Strictly speaking, this is not a question of whether human cognition 
exists, which  is an ontological problem, but rather a question of what 
we understand by human cognition—a problem of defi nition that is, in 
effect, closely related to the epistemological problem. In Lantolf’s terms, 
do we understand human cognition as occurring isolated within the 
brain of an individual or do we instead consider it as a dialectical rela-
tionship between the individual brain and the social world in which we 
live, a dialectic mediated by language, culture, and cultural artifacts? 
This is, then, a question of our understanding of cognition, and surely, 
therefore, how we arrive at that understanding is greatly infl uenced by 
the means with which we pursue it. 
 In the cultural-historical school of psychology that Lantolf advances, 
the genetic method of researching cognition (i.e., higher mental functions) 
is quite different from other schools of psychology. The genetic method 
emerged as Vygotsky’s response to the dualism of mind and body put 
forward by Descartes and others, and it involves studying the processes 
through which human cognition develops (rather than the outcome 
of those processes). In the genetic method, the dynamic of cognitive 
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development can be studied in several aspects: the evolutionary devel-
opment of the species (phylogenesis), the historical development of 
culture and tools, the development of an individual person (ontogenesis), 
and the continuous formative activity underlying cognition (micro-
genesis). Genetic investigations that aim to discover the origin, trend, 
rate, direction, and pattern of cognitive development describe a process 
very different from studying a given cognitive phenomenon or a par-
ticular behavior for its own sake. Genetic investigations are much 
more extensive than other investigations because they recognize that 
human cognition arises from interaction between biological and cul-
tural inheritances. 
 To summarize, the concept of cognition espoused by Lantolf and other 
advocates of cognitive-historical psychology is indeed very different from 
the concept of cognition taken as the basis of research by psychologists 
who do not attend to the cultural and historical development of cognitive 
phenomena. The difference between the two is, I have argued, a difference 
of ways of knowing, of method. In other words, the difference between 
the two approaches is a question of epistemology, not ontology. 
 THOUGHT STYLES 
 Methods of inquiry that L2 researchers prefer differ from one thought 
collective to another. Because learning and using a L2 is a vast and 
vastly complex phenomenon, any way of investigating the phenomenon 
inevitably involves attending to some aspects and disattending from 
others. Selective attention to different phenomena is the principal way 
in which thought collectives differ, and it is an important part of Fleck’s 
theory of thought style, which he defi ned as
 directed perception, with corresponding mental and objective assimilation 
of what has been so perceived . It is characterized by common features in 
the problems of interest to a thought collective, by the judgment which 
the thought collective considers evident, and by the methods which it 
applies as a means of cognition. (1935/1979, p. 99) 
 The way that different researchers attend to different aspects of L2 
learning and even how the same researcher comes to attend to different 
aspects have been described by researchers who introspect on their 
own research process. In her contribution to this article, Mackey, for 
instance, has recounted a shift in her own attention to the nature of 
interaction involving language learners. From a research posture of ini-
tial disattention from the social factors underlying interaction, Mackey 
(e.g., in Philp and Mackey,  2010 ) refocused her attention to consider the 
relationships among learners and how they impacted what learners were 
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willing and able to listen and attend to, and thus what they produced. 
Mackey’s attentional change parallels the recognition by a number of 
authors of the different roles for the human subject in language learning 
experiments, depending on whether researchers focus narrowly on the 
phenomenon of interest or whether they expand the focus of their 
attention to include their subjects’ social and political roles with other 
subjects, with the researcher, and with the society beyond the walls of 
the laboratory. For instance, in her early studies of the cognitive process 
of reading in a foreign language, Cavalcanti ( 1983 ) found that her sub-
jects not only reported their thoughts about reading but also framed 
them in the social context of their roles as subjects in a research study. 
In more recent applied linguistic studies of metaphor, which earlier 
studies had interpreted narrowly as an index of cognition alone, 
Zanotto, Cameron, and Cavalcanti ( 2008 ) argued that metaphor must be 
understood as social and situated, not merely a refl ex of thought. 
Refl ection by these investigators on interaction, reading, and metaphor 
reveals the importance of attending to the social contexts of human 
subjects in studies of L2 learning and teaching because they index how 
subjects position themselves with respect to their social and political 
roles with other subjects, with the researcher, and with the society 
beyond the walls of the classroom or laboratory. As Preston ( 1989 ) 
pointed out, even in studies of classroom interaction, researchers 
should attend to their subjects’ membership in different communities 
inside and outside the classroom. 
 The habits of mind—the phenomena to which researchers attend and 
how they analyze and interpret them—characterize a thought style. But 
neither thought styles nor thought collectives are immutable, and the 
examples of perspectival change reported by Mackey (this article), 
Cavalcanti ( 1983 ), and Zanotto et al. ( 2008 ) show how changes in the 
thought styles of individuals index historical development within a par-
ticular thought collective. What this implies is that, instead of looking at 
the differences between social approaches and cognitive approaches to 
research in L2 learning and teaching (the thought collectives), it is more 
fruitful to consider the thought styles of individual investigators, their 
activities, their habits of mind, and how they position themselves within 
the social process of investigation and publication. This is the perspec-
tive taken by Talmy in proposing an interpretivist turn in L2 inquiry, in 
which explaining anything says as much about the explainer as about 
the thing being explained. 
 AN INTERPRETIVIST TURN IN L2 INQUIRY 
 In his contribution to this article, Talmy has argued that all research in the 
social sciences is the outcome of the interpretive activity of particular 
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people working from particular disciplinary and theoretical orientations 
in particular social contexts and historical moments. In the previous 
section, I have tried to address disciplinary and theoretical orientations 
of particular researchers in L2 learning and teaching, but let me now 
turn to two other issues within an interpretive perspective that have to 
do with the world outside the confi nes of the discipline: How is the work 
of researchers in L2 learning and teaching disseminated, and how is 
their work interpreted in the social world? 
 Nobody was born an applied linguist, and there are very few under-
graduate degrees in applied linguistics, so most of us come from 
backgrounds in psychology, linguistics, literature, or language teaching—a 
diversity captured in Bob Dylan’s words, “some are mathematicians, 
some are carpenters’ wives” (Dylan,  1975 , track 1). We read literature in 
fi elds that interest us and disseminate our research in journals that 
we read, and, as a result, the thought collective reproduces itself. In our 
fi eld, one journal defi nes itself as “a scientifi c journal dedicated to the 
understanding of language learning broadly defi ned,” whereas another 
journal broadcasts its mission as publishing “research and discussion 
about the learning and teaching of foreign and second languages.” The 
fi rst journal mentions science, and the second mentions teaching; and, 
perhaps, one journal appeals more to mathematicians, the other to 
carpenters’ wives. Whatever the readership, however, the economics of 
publishing may restrict the length of articles that any journal can print, 
and both journals announce on their Web sites that the length of articles 
they publish is generally less than 10,000 words. Such a length require-
ment may restrict publication vehicles for authors using interpretive 
methods of ethnography, case study, narrative inquiry, and even meta-
analyses, while it may impose few constraints on reports of experiments, 
archival analyses, or other methods in which numerical representation 
of L2 phenomena restricts consideration of the multiple contexts in 
which languages are learned and limits attention to differences among 
learners. 
 A second issue raised by the interpretive approach is how research, 
once published and disseminated, infl uences the social world of those 
human subjects who participate in it and those who read it. As Giddens 
( 1984 ) fi rst observed, a difference between the social sciences and 
the natural sciences is that, because the work of social scientists is 
embedded in its subject matter—human society—their work (inten-
tionally or unavoidably) enters constitutively into the social phenomena 
they describe. In other words, whereas the natural scientist maintains a 
subject-object relation with phenomena, for the social scientist, the 
relation is a refl exive one of subject-subject. Some researchers take an 
active stance in the relationship with their subjects and work to uncover 
ways in which the context of language learning creates, reproduces, and 
provides opportunities for resistance to dominant power and ideology. 
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In some cases, a researcher’s values may be fundamentally pessimistic. 
For example, some critical researchers identify sources of oppression 
and ground their analyses in the belief that we live in a fundamentally 
unjust world. For others, critical research is founded on the view that 
knowledge of the connections between local educational practices and 
societal ideologies may further an individual learner’s resistance and 
struggle against the preponderant infl uence of harmful public policy. 
Taking a less critical view but nonetheless doing research to better 
language teaching and learning practices is the object of action research, a 
form of self-refl ective inquiry often undertaken by teachers to improve 
the effectiveness of their teaching, their understanding of their teaching 
practice, and the relation between their own teaching and the institu-
tional context in which they teach. 
 One argument against conceiving of research in this way as an essen-
tially pragmatic undertaking to improve the lives of language learners 
or the effectiveness of teachers is that such limited goals of inquiry may 
lead to only a partial understanding of the phenomenon. Because crit-
ical inquiry and action research are essentially normative, researchers 
working within these domains take both a moral and a pragmatic stance 
with respect to language learning. The moral stance is that certain 
aspects of people’s use and attitudes toward languages and their 
speakers are unjust, inequitable, unfair, or just plain wrong, and the 
pragmatic stance concerns what to do about it. Normative judgments 
about social situations of language use are, however, located within the 
political and cultural context of the critic, such that criticizing anything 
says as much about the critic as about the phenomenon being criticized. 
A second argument against research as a pragmatic undertaking is that 
by focusing on the solution of a specifi c problem, researchers may 
be unaware of the context of the problem and the unintended conse-
quences of their intervention. The safest goal for critical researchers is 
perhaps, as suggested by Habermas (1968/1971), not to control social 
processes or even to infl uence the decisions that teachers, learners, 
and institutional authorities make in any determinate sort of way but 
rather to initiate public processes of self-refl ection. 
 CONCLUSION 
 I have argued that the methods and data that characterize L2 learning 
research from a cognitive or a social point of view are differences in thought 
style prevalent within different thought collectives. I have tried to recast 
those differences as indexes of historical development within research in 
language learning and teaching. Because individuals from different thought 
collectives chose to attend the 2013 AAAL colloquium in Dallas, where 
they eloquently addressed the issues that apparently separate them, their 
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discussions revealed that understanding one another includes misun-
derstanding one another in a different sense. Misunderstandings are inevi-
table because habits of mind—observation habits, habits of analysis, 
habits of interpretation, and habits of dissemination—differ from one 
thought collective to another. However, as Fleck (1935/1979) put it, com-
munication “never occurs without a transformation, and indeed always 
involves a stylized remodeling, which intracollectively achieves corrobo-
ration and which intercollectively yields fundamental alteration” (p. 111). 
Maybe Bob Dylan put it better: “We always did feel the same / We just saw 
it from a different point of view / Tangled up in blue” (Dylan,  1975 , track 1). 
 Part 3: Unsolved Problems and Unasked Questions 
 COGNITIVE  AND SOCIAL LANGUAGE USAGE 
 Nick C. Ellis 
 University of Michigan 
 Language is essentially human. It is the crowning accomplishment of our 
social and cognitive competences. Language bridges society and cogni-
tion. It is a distributed, emergent phenomenon. People and language 
create each other, grow from each other, and act and change under the 
infl uence of each other. Language and cognition are mutually inextricable; 
they determine each other. Language has come to represent the world 
as we know it; it is grounded in our perceptual experience. Language is 
used to organize, process, and convey information from one person to 
another, from one embodied mind to another. Learning language involves 
determining structure from usage, and this, like learning about all other 
aspects of the world, involves the full scope of cognition: the remem-
bering of utterances and episodes; the categorization of experience; the 
determination of patterns among and between stimuli; the generaliza-
tion of conceptual schema and prototypes from exemplars; and the 
use of cognitive models, metaphors, analogies, and images in thinking. 
Language is used to focus the listener’s attention to the world; it can 
foreground different elements in the theatre of consciousness to poten-
tially relate many different stories and perspectives about the same scene. 
What is attended is the focus of learning, and so attention controls the 
acquisition of language itself. The functions of language in discourse deter-
mine its usage and learning. Language structure, language acquisition, 
language processing and usage, and language change are similarly in-
separable: They are facets of the same complex, adaptive system. 
 So each of us, whatever our theoretical background, shares a fascina-
tion with language, and we try to understand it. We ask our questions, 
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so many of them, and so interesting. We do our research. Our diverse 
questions require different methods. Language learning diaries, func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scanners, analyses of service 
interactions using conversational analysis (CA), introspection, visual 
world eye-tracking, classroom interaction recordings, computer simula-
tions, artifi cial grammar learning experiments, billion-word corpora 
of usage, questionnaires, dynamic assessment, event-related potentials 
(ERPs), think-alouds, feedback manipulations,  n -back tasks, psychometric 
batteries, error analysis, longitudinal corpora, laboratory experiments, 
classroom fi eld experiments, ethnographic research, agent-based mod-
eling, contrastive analysis, brain connectivity analysis, dynamic systems 
analysis, behavioral genetics, idiographic and nomothetic approaches, 
thick and thin descriptions, emic and etic approaches . . . are all usefully 
applicable techniques, but they are useful for different things. Distrust 
introspection as a valid index of the working of the prefrontal cortex 
and anterior cingulum in bilingual code switching. There is a reason 
we have neuroscience. Distrust armchair analyses of language change. 
There is a reason we have corpus linguistics. Distrust parental recollec-
tions of their child’s language 20 years prior. There is a reason we make 
dense longitudinal recordings of language interaction. Distrust current 
computer models of emotional interaction. There is a reason we prefer 
people to chatbots. Distrust overzealous current technology: Do not 
expect rich cultural competence from computerized language instruc-
tion or solitary infants to learn language when sat in front of a TV. We 
are social beings. Different research methods suit different purposes. 
Personally, I have learned much about language from my children, from 
laboratory experiments, from connectionist modeling, from learning a 
L2, from analyzing the British National Corpus, and from behavioral 
genetic research, but differently so. 
 As we research all of our questions, we will incrementally develop a 
better understanding of language. But if we do it simply in the way that 
I have listed pieces of the enterprise here, it will be piecemeal theory. 
We need an additional understanding of how the pieces fi t together, 
interacting in space and time over many different levels of granularity 
and timescale. Distrust any theory that claims that you can comprehen-
sively study a component in isolation: syntax separate from lexis or 
semantics, form from function, representation from processing, diachronic 
from synchronic, knowledge from experience, behavior from brain, 
competence from usage, and so on (N. C. Ellis & Larsen-Freeman,  2006 ). 
Especially pertinent here is the social-cognitive gap. Such partitioning 
leads to theoretical, ontological, and social isolation; self-aggrandizement; 
and autistic hostility. Diversity is powerfully creative if there is chance 
of interaction (Darwin, 1859/1928; Holland,  1998 ; Page,  2008 ,  2010 ). 
I am encouraged by the multiple perspectives currently represented 
within usage-based approaches to language (Behrens,  2009 ; Bybee, 
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 2010 ; N. C. Ellis, O’Donnell, & Römer,  2013 ; Robinson & Ellis,  2008 ; 
Tomasello,  2003 ; Trousdale & Hoffmann,  2013 ). These hold that we 
learn language while engaging in communication—the “interpersonal 
communicative and cognitive processes that everywhere and always 
shape language” (Slobin,  1997 , p. 267). Some of the basic tenets, many 
of them explicitly addressed by de Saussure (1916/1983), include the 
following:
  
 1.  Language is intrinsically symbolic, constituted by a structured inventory of 
constructions as conventionalized form-meaning pairings used for communi-
cative purposes. 
 2.  Language is intrinsically linked to human cognition and processes of percep-
tion, attention, learning, categorization, schematization, and memory. 
 3.  Adult language knowledge consists of a continuum of linguistic construc-
tions of different levels of complexity and abstraction. Constructions can com-
prise concrete and particular items (as in words and idioms), more abstract 
classes of items (as in word classes and abstract constructions), or complex 
combinations of concrete and abstract pieces of language (as mixed con-
structions). No rigid separation exists between lexis and grammar. 
 4.  Constructions may be simultaneously represented and stored in multiple 
forms, at various levels of abstraction (e.g., concrete item:  table +  s =  tables and 
[Noun] + [morpheme  -s ] = plural things). 
 5.  Constructions can thus be meaningful linguistic symbols in their own right, 
existing independently of particular lexical items. Nevertheless, construc-
tions and the particular lexical tokens that occupy them attract each other, 
and grammar and lexis are inseparable. 
 6.  Language structure emerges ontogenetically from usage in particular con-
texts. Development is slow and gradual, moving from an initial reliance on 
concrete items to more abstract linguistic schemata. This process is depen-
dent on the type and token frequencies with which particular constructions 
appear in the input. Storage of wholes depends on token frequency; the 
development of abstract linguistic schema depends on type frequency. 
  
 From analyses of large usage corpora, we can analyze the latent struc-
tures of language and their roles in the associative and cognitive 
learning of language (N. C. Ellis et al.,  2013 ). This is the stuff of cognitive 
psychology, associative learning theory, and corpus linguistics. But in 
addition to construction forms and their frequencies, there are their 
meanings—embodied, attended, consciously formed in dialogue and 
dialectic, and situated and encultured in social and educational interac-
tion. Usage-based theories hold that an individual’s creative linguistic 
competence emerges from the collaboration of the memories of all the 
meaningful interactions in his or her entire history of language usage. 
 Cognitive linguistics (Croft & Cruise,  2004 ; Langacker,  2000 ; Robinson & 
Ellis,  2008 ) provides detailed analyses of how language is grounded in 
our experience and our physical embodiment, which represents the 
world in particular ways. The meaning of words in languages and how 
Jan H. Hulstijn et al.400
they can be used in combination depends on the perception and cate-
gorization of the real world around us. Because we constantly observe 
and play an active role in this world, we know a great deal about the 
entities of which it consists. This familiarity is refl ected in the nature of 
language. Ultimately, everything we know is organized and related to 
our other knowledge in some meaningful way, and everything we per-
ceive is affected by our perceptual apparatus and our high-level motor 
control and motor apparatus: Spatial language is grounded in the visual 
processing system as it relates to motor action, the multiple constraints 
relating to object knowledge, dynamic-kinematic routines, and functional 
geometric analyses (Coventry & Garrod,  2004 ). Action elements relating 
to hand posture, joint motions, force, aspect, and goals are all relevant 
to linguistic distinctions (Bergen & Chang,  2012 ). Meanings are embodied 
and dynamic (Spivey,  2006 ); they are fl exibly constructed online. Here 
we have the embodied, dynamic mind of modern cognitive science 
(A. Clark,  1998 ; Rosch, Varela, & Thompson,  1991 ). 
 Shared attention, shared cooperative activity, and shared cognition 
are key to meaningful language usage. In their fi rst 2 years, infants 
develop their capabilities of attention detection (gaze following), atten-
tion manipulation (directive pointing), intention understanding (the 
realization that others are goal directed), and social coordination with 
shared intentionality (engaging in joint activities with shared interest, 
negotiating meanings), and these processes are central in child language 
acquisition (Tomasello,  1999 ,  2008 ). 
 The nature of language follows from its role in social interaction. Social 
interactions are typically characterized by what philosophers of action call 
shared cooperative activity (Bratman,  1992 ) or joint actions (H. H. Clark, 
 1996 ). Joint actions are dependent on what might be broadly called shared 
cognition, a human being’s recognition that she can share beliefs and inten-
tions with other humans. Thus usage-based approaches emphasize how 
language is learned from the participatory experience of processing 
language during embodied interaction in social and cultural contexts in 
which individually desired outcomes are goals to be achieved by commu-
nicating intentions, concepts, and meaning with others. Conversation 
partners scaffold and coconstruct meanings. Socially scaffolded noticing 
(Schmidt,  1990 ) solves Quine’s ( 1969 ) problem of referential indetermi-
nacy and builds so much more. The dynamics of language learning are 
inextricably linked to the dynamics of consciousness, in neural activity 
and in the social world as well (U. Frith & Frith,  2010 ). Input to the asso-
ciative network is gated by consciousness, and consciousness is cocon-
structed in social interaction (N. C. Ellis,  2005 ; C. Frith,  2010 ). In these 
ways, the input to the associative network is socially gated (Kuhl,  2007 ). 
 Language—and language learning—is ever thus. It takes place in social 
usage, involving action, reaction, collaborative interaction, intersubjec-
tivity, and mutually assisted performance (Lantolf & Thorne,  2006 ). 
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Speech, speakers, identity, and social relationships are inseparable 
(Lee, Mikesell, Joaquin, Mates, & Schumann,  2009 ; Norton,  1997 ; Tarone, 
 2007 ). Activity theory emphasizes how individual learning is an emergent, 
holistic property of a dynamic system comprising many infl uences: 
social, individual, and contextual. Action provides a context within 
which the individual and society, mental functioning, and sociocultural 
context can be understood as interrelated moments (Wertsch,  1998 ). 
The associative learning network is culturally gated. Tomasello’s construc-
tionist approach to language unites with his research in comparative 
primate cognition, the unique place of social cooperation in humans, and 
the Vygotskian intelligence hypothesis, whereby regular participation 
in cooperative, cultural interactions during ontogeny leads children to 
construct uniquely powerful forms of perspectival cognitive represen-
tation, including language itself (Moll & Tomasello,  2007 ). The last 
40 years have seen huge progress in research into social cognition, 
and within social cognitive neuroscience there is now a rich under-
standing of the role of implicit and explicit knowledge in social cognition 
(C. D. Frith & Frith,  2008 ), of the role of consciousness and metacogni-
tion in social interaction (C. Frith,  2010 ), and of the brain mechanisms 
involved in these processes (U. Frith & Frith,  2010 ). From the very name 
of the fi eld, you can tell that there is no social-cognitive divide within 
contemporary social cognitive neuroscience. 
 How should we research this usage? If language learning is in the 
social cognitive linguistic moment, we need to capture all these moments 
so that we can objectively study them. We need large, dense, longitudinal 
corpora of language use with audio, video, transcriptions, and multiple 
layers of annotation for data sharing in open archives. We need these in 
a suffi ciently dense mass that we can chart learners’ usage history 
and their development (Tomasello & Stahl,  2004 ). We need them in 
suffi cient detail that we can get down to the fi ne detail of CA analyses 
of the moment (Kasper & Wagner,  2011 ). Brian MacWhinney has long 
been working toward these ends, fi rst with the Child Language Data 
Exchange System (CHILDES; MacWhinney,  1991 ) and then with Talkbank 
(MacWhinney,  2007 ). These projects have developed various comput-
erized language analysis (CLAN) tools for computer analyses of large 
bodies of data, right down to, in collaboration with Johannes Wagner, 
tools for a fi ne-grained CA bank ( http://talkbank.org/CABank ). With these 
types of data, we can study the cognitive and the social. This way 
the future lies. These are huge contributions to language acquisition 
research, though, at the moment, the data are relatively sparse. We need 
much more, especially for studies of L2 learning and teaching. We need 
big, dense, longitudinal data sets that we can all observe; it is up to the 
fi eld to contribute to these open archives. 
 We need theoretical integration, too. Cognition; consciousness; 
experience; embodiment; brain; self; and human interaction, society, 
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culture, and history are all inextricably intertwined in rich, complex, 
and dynamic ways in language. We require additional perspectives 
on dynamic interactions between levels, perspectives provided by 
approaches such as complex adaptive systems (N. C. Ellis & Larsen-
Freeman,  2009 ), dynamic systems theory (de Bot, Lowie, & Verspoor, 
 2007 ; N. C. Ellis,  2008 ; Spivey,  2006 ), and emergentism (N. C. Ellis,  1998 ; 
N. C. Ellis & Larsen-Freeman,  2006 ; MacWhinney,  1999 ). 
 At the AAAL 2013 colloquium in Dallas, I was asked to talk from a cog-
nitive perspective along with Martha Bigelow, who was presenting for 
the social side. I knew how lucky I was in this pairing:  Language Learning 
had previously published her excellent monograph  Mogadishu on the 
Mississippi: Language, Racialized Identity, and Education in a New Land 
(Bigelow,  2010 ). At the end of her presentation, I was asked if I wanted 
to respond. Postperformance zonked and worried by the adequacy of my 
own contribution and the large, varied, and potentially awesomely crit-
ical audience (you, maybe?), I was not prepared for this. But our joint 
reaction was easy. In the moment, we faced each other, checked the trust 
in each other’s eyes, smiled, shook hands, and embraced. It emerged in 
that cognitive-social moment: There was no cognitive-social divide. For my 
part, it was easy to embrace the position of someone who blends together 
approaches from focus groups, sociocultural analysis, storytelling, psy-
cholinguistics, and educational evaluation, as they are appropriate in 
dealing with very real educational and social issues of immigration. As 
Ortega noted in her discussion of our presentations at the colloquium, 
we can go beyond simple dichotomies if we choose to imagine better, we 
can strategically try to undo these outdated notions, and we can socially 
coconstruct something superior. There is no social-cognitive gap. 
 BLENDING SOCIAL AND COGNITIVE RESEARCH TRADITIONS 
IN LANGUAGE LEARNING AND TEACHING 
 A Matter of Mentoring and Modeling 
 Martha Bigelow 
 University of Minnesota 
 There is a story behind every study, and it seems as though most studies 
are a series of compromises, with hindsight being 20-20. We always 
miss something or discover limitations, and I hope this piece offers 
encouragement for researchers to try doing research in new ways, with 
different populations, in different settings, and using new, hybrid, or 
mixed methodologies. There are many ways of knowing, and we should 
push our use of current methodologies to make our analyses better and 
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to explore possibilities for blending research traditions in ways that 
give us more insight into phenomena studied in the fi elds of language 
learning and teaching. 
 I would like to take the colloquium and this article as opportunities to 
discuss some of the ways the epistemological polarization of our fi eld 
between cognitive and social approaches to inquiry limits the sorts of 
questions we allow ourselves, and our students, to ask. I also describe 
the damaging impact this polarization of research can have on our 
students. Our students are in the process of making sense of the wide 
range of research they read and making decisions about who they want 
to be as researchers. They are in the process of choosing their research 
contexts, their questions, and their methodology. Unfortunately, this 
process often results in students leaving behind their teacher selves or 
their selves as cultural beings. 
 Personally, I am not loyal to any research method, but I have not done 
studies that fully combine approaches in a balanced way. In other words, 
I have done work in the cognitive camp and brought in minor data 
sources analyzed in a qualitative way, particularly in my initial years as 
a researcher. Or, more increasingly in recent years, I have done intensely 
ethnographic work that also attempts to identify certain data points 
that have implications for language learning and teaching. Being episte-
mologically open does not necessarily mean a researcher is able to 
merge the two, and that is what I wish we were able to do more of and 
do better. The main reason for bridging methodological approaches is 
to make our research stronger and our fi ndings more grounded and, 
hopefully, more useful to others. The training and the investment needed 
to do this sort of research, however, are different than what the academy 
typically offers. 
 I began to realize this through my work in our Somali communities of 
Minnesota with Elaine Tarone and Kit Hansen (Tarone, Bigelow, & 
Hansen,  2009 ). The fi rst study we did was cognitive to the core (Bigelow, 
delMas, Hansen, & Tarone,  2006 ). But in gaining access to the research 
participants, I had to do a lot of work in the Somali community. I had to 
become known, build trust, and develop relationships to gain access. 
As I did the work it took to get my data, I changed as a researcher. I began 
to learn about the perspectives of Somali transnationals in an urban 
setting and the political and policy contexts of language learning and 
education. My cognitive study of language learning started to get com-
plicated because of my attachments to the community, my new ties 
with community activists, community concerns, and individuals who 
were asking me to help them learn to read. These experiences led to 
new research questions and methods that allowed me to leverage all of 
my teaching and intercultural skills—skills that were minimally tapped 
in our study. In this qualitative and ethnographic work (e.g., Bigelow, 
 2007 ,  2010 ,  2011 ;  Bigelow & King, in press ), I found that I was challenged 
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by four teenage Somalis to understand issues of schooling, literacy, 
culture, and religion, among other things, while, at the same time, trying 
to systematically track language learning. There was no way to link their 
performance to any intervention. The only thing I kept noticing about 
the girls was how prior schooling and engagement with print literacy 
mattered time and time again. The thing I noticed about myself was that 
I was becoming an engaged researcher, and, for me, my research was 
beginning to take an advocacy turn. Even after this transformation, the 
issue remains that, although I am not loyal to any one research paradigm, 
I embody both, but I do not bring them together well. The challenge I see 
is the common desire to contribute to generalizable research and theory 
building in language learning and teaching, while also using everything 
the fi eld knows about the importance of identity, ideology, and context. 
 I have seen many of our doctoral students, who are our next genera-
tion of researchers in language learning and teaching, try to combine 
approaches. I would like to describe some of their challenges; I think 
they will resonate with many readers. It is common for students in our 
doctoral program in the Department of Curriculum and Instruction 
at the University of Minnesota to be deeply interested in research on 
language learning and teaching. Then, through their coursework, they 
read into fi elds such as cultural studies, anthropology, and immigrant 
education through lenses of social justice. We have many classes that 
give them formal training to do this, and our faculty members support 
any research design that seems to match the students’ research ques-
tions, including research that uses quantitative, qualitative, or mixed 
methods as well as ethnographic, hermeneutic, and phenomenological 
approaches. But what occurs is that, as our students design these 
studies, they struggle to create designs that would produce research that 
can dialogue with established cognitive research in language learning and 
teaching, which is what they often, but not always, hope to do. For 
example, their doctoral dissertation research, in an effort to be situated, 
culturally sensitive, and aware of learners as individuals (not just as a L1 
group or a nationality), may not have enough participants to allow for infer-
ential statistics and theory building in the cognitivist realm. This tendency 
results in students choosing designs that are not quantitative, yet hoping 
to produce knowledge that contributes to ongoing cognitivist dialogues, 
particularly dialogues about language development. I will give two exam-
ples of students who are doing research in language learning and teaching 
but are not using quantitative research designs. Both are presently in the 
middle of the process of planning their doctoral dissertation studies. 
 One of our students became very interested in using tasks to promote 
more linguistic complexity among learners. Her research questions 
emerged from issues of practice, and she wants her study to have impli-
cations for practice. But she found it hard to reconcile the practical 
nature of language teaching and the task-based learning research that 
Bridging the Gap 405
often isolates task features with psycholinguistic rationale for task 
complexity, accuracy, fl uency, and cognitive demand (e.g., Robinson & 
Gilabert,  2007 ; Skehan & Foster,  2007 ). This student wished to account 
for what happens when learners do their tasks collaboratively—what 
happens from a sociocultural standpoint. In other words, she was inter-
ested in what happens among learners, how they perceive one another, 
and how they jointly infl uence the way the task unfolds. She wanted 
to know what sociocultural factors and task features contribute to 
language development. If one thinks about all a researcher needs to 
know to do this sort of study, it is daunting (although see Storch,  2013 , 
for a review of worthy attempts). She needs to know about task design 
and analysis, language analysis, activity theory, and how to gather 
high-quality fi eld notes and interviews. This student took a class in 
sociocultural theory in our department but had to read deeply into the 
application of activity theory to L2 learning and teaching mainly on her 
own. She had multiple classes in SLA and applied linguistics but needed 
to fi gure out how to apply this body of knowledge to her tasks and analysis. 
It was challenging to fi gure out a manageable classroom research 
design for this classroom language learning research: How many dyads 
did she need to be able to track language learning? Once given access to 
an intact class, how many tasks could she logistically carry out without 
interfering too much with the curriculum? 
 These challenges resulted in explorations of a time series design to 
track language learning, which was discounted after consultation with a 
statistician. Presently, she is analyzing the language-related episodes 
and language complexity of two dyads, mostly qualitatively. The stu-
dent worries that her work may not be taken seriously by those who 
study task-based learning, that she can only talk about language learning 
through the particular cases, that her qualitative results will not be gen-
eralizable, and that it is very challenging to link the interview and obser-
vational data to language production without a high level of speculation 
and interpretation. As a fi eld, we have a problem when a student and 
her committee are making decisions on study design that largely reifi es 
the ideological divide in our fi eld, instead of allowing the student to 
leverage her dual interest in language learning as both a developmental 
and a social process. Sometimes the feasibility of a study carried out in 
a classroom affords fewer opportunities to gather longitudinal L2 acqui-
sition data, which may lead the researcher to carry out more microanal-
yses on dyadic interaction or more out-of-class interviews on the tasks 
carried out in the class. 
 Another example is a student who knew she wanted to study L2 
writing by international students in higher education. She wanted to 
systematically track language development alongside international 
students’ experiences in their undergraduate classes. She was drawn to 
both language socialization as well as traditional research frameworks 
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in language learning and teaching. She gathered data in students’ under-
graduate writing class. She attended every class period three times a 
week for 15 weeks and now has all their writing assignments and about 
45 hours of classroom video. She also has multiple interviews with each 
of her four focal participants and recordings from all of their writing 
conferences. This is an enormous amount of data, and this student 
would tell you that she sometimes feels like she has fi ve dissertations 
going on. She told me that she felt that there are not a lot of studies that 
do what she is trying to do or that perhaps she is trying to do something 
that is overwhelming. Language socialization (e.g., Duff & Talmy,  2011 ) 
has allowed her to see that one of the main purposes of the class is to 
socialize students into critical thinking and developing arguments that 
critically present multiple viewpoints. But her dilemma is pinpointing 
how this instructional goal is refl ected in students’ language use. 
Students are learning macro writing and speaking skills related to crit-
ical thinking, which is built on countless linguistic skills used in myriad 
ways depending on genre and topic, among other things (e.g., Cumming, 
 2013 ). She is wondering what to quantify without losing sight of qualita-
tive aspects of socialization into critical thinking. This is much more than 
tracking discrete linguistic features. Language socialization is also 
taking new and multiple directions in studies of L2 learning, and this 
student, as a novice researcher, is tentatively making analysis decisions 
that may be uncommon in the emerging applications of language social-
ization. This student wisely conceded that if you do one or the other—
look at context or look at language learning—you can ignore a lot. If you 
are doing both, you have to look at it all, and this is hard to do as a 
beginning researcher. The data gathered for this dissertation will 
include multiple examples of how students engage in critical thinking, 
or attempt to offer evidence of their critical thinking. These instances 
can be analyzed in depth within and across a small number of partic-
ipants, but it would be diffi cult to go back and gather longitudinal L2 
acquisition data from more participants. For this reason, it is crucial 
to decide early on whether a certain number of participants are 
necessary to carry out an analysis to answer a predetermined SLA 
question. 
 I am sure that both of these students will produce excellent disserta-
tions, but the ideological divide they are navigating causes them uncer-
tainty in terms of who the audience is for their work. They both worry 
whether they will be convincing to anyone as they try to reconcile 
the issue of who their primary audience is. They worry about fi tting 
incongruous theories, methodologies, and research contexts together in 
ways that produce useful knowledge for our fi eld. 
 The methodological and epistemological challenges our students 
face are the result of the traditions or heritage in our fi eld. These tradi-
tions often support a damaging dichotomy of ideologies as well as a lack 
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of role models who do the work our students hope to do. What can we 
do in this situation? I believe the best we can do is to trust our students’ 
new reading of the fi eld and defend their choices to do innovative work 
that bridges cognitive and social approaches. What I see us doing is 
something different. Students work hard to acquire new habits of mind 
as they learn new discourses and cultures in academia. Yet we project 
methodological fear in them, which limits their willingness to take risks 
or to listen to their own (often vast) experience with language teaching 
and learning. I often wonder what would happen if we were to allow 
ourselves and our students to stay true to what we care about and what 
we want to research and to use all of our good sense and research tools 
to do this, regardless of the ideological divides in the fi eld. One could 
say that an apprentice to research in L2 learning and teaching must 
submit to a socialization process that leads him or her to more confi -
dence as a researcher. However, we must remember that socialization 
goes both ways. Our students can and should change us as we do our 
own research and seek wisdom as we guide theirs. 
 We are all actors in the stories behind the studies we do, and my plea is 
for established researchers to try to bridge the divide themselves and to 
support new researchers to take risks in their own work. I trust that the 
fi eld will move forward in productive ways with more attempts to bridge 
the cognitive and social gap in research on language learning and teaching. 
 THE COGNITIVE-SOCIAL GAP 
 Multiple Understandings, Hopeful Commensurabilities 
 Lourdes Ortega 
 Georgetown University 
 In their contributions to this article, Nick Ellis and Martha Bigelow have 
chosen to highlight bridge building and bridge traveling, respectively. 
With these choices, each offers hopeful understandings of the cognitive-
social gap. Yet, each is also cautious. Ellis proposes complementarity 
protected by a certain epistemic independence, which is to be achieved 
by a disciplinary division of research labor. Bigelow encourages bridge 
traveling through epistemic blending, but she also painfully details the 
vulnerabilities and risks involved in the enterprise.  4  There is much 
agreement in their hopeful yet cautious framings of the issues. All the 
same, there are also differences in their understandings of the gap 
and in the solutions they offer. In this refl ection, I align myself with a 
similar spirit of cautious optimism. I want to emphasize the multiplicity 
of understandings of the alleged cognitive-social gap and affi rm the 
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search for hopeful moments of commensurability across cognitive and 
social epistemic lines. 
 RESPONDING POSITIVELY TO THE GAP: BRIDGE BUILDING AND 
BRIDGE TRAVELING 
 For Ellis, language and language learning and use are at once cognitive 
and social. Therefore, their study must be tackled from both cognitive 
and social perspectives. In other words, it is the very nature of the 
objects of study that creates the justifi cation for bridging cognitive and 
social inquiry; the need for bridge building is thus rationalized as an 
ontological imperative. Ellis stipulates, however, a disciplinary division 
of labor: Multiple social and cognitive dimensions of language learning 
and use dictate different granularities and timescales for research 
and thus require different research questions and demand different 
methods. This being so, cognitive and social dimensions must be 
addressed by different communities—or in Fleck’s (1935/1979) sense, 
by different thought collectives and their resulting thought styles. Thus 
there is epistemic independence in the complementarity Ellis proposes. 
He also sees a need for theoretical integration and fi nds it in usage-
based approaches. This family of theories stipulates that the cognitive 
and the social, the abstract and the physical, and even the empirical and 
the meditative create layers of phenomena that, at the metatheoretical 
level, are interdependent and must be integrated into explanations of 
human cognition (MacWhinney,  1999 ; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch,  1991 ). 
When complementarity in epistemic independence is looked at from 
this integrative metatheoretical perspective, a bridge is built that invites 
the traveler to cease viewing the cognitive-social gap as a threat. 
 For Bigelow, too, the relevant phenomena to be explained include 
social and cognitive dimensions. She feels, however, accountable to 
bridging the social and the cognitive by blending the two dimensions in 
her own research praxis—that is, within single studies and within the 
same research program. Thus, her account bears witness to researchers 
who respond to the gap by trying to close it through bridge traveling. 
Bigelow shares her arresting awareness of the vulnerabilities and risks 
involved in these efforts. For senior researchers like her, and even more 
so for junior researchers and students, bridge traveling via epistemic 
blending, she tells readers, can be a tremendous challenge. One could 
argue that the motivation for epistemic blending of such proportions 
goes beyond ontological understandings of the object of study and is 
fueled by a bottom-up, problem-oriented enticement (or felt necessity) 
to transcend, in practice, whatever cognitive-social dichotomies appear 
to be in opposition. In Bigelow’s case, studying the underserved popula-
tion of Somali adolescents in urban Minnesota challenged what she and 
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her colleagues thought they knew about language learning and use 
(Bigelow & Tarone,  2004 ) and what they decided they needed to know, 
and it commanded a broaching of social and cognitive dimensions of 
the problem at once. Her bottom-up justifi cation for the need to travel 
cognitive-social gaps resonates with views of applied linguists who argue 
that research should begin with an analysis of both the given problem 
that needs to be understood and transformed and the anticipated 
consequences of the given research, with the choice of methods and 
theories subordinated to that analysis. Far from being monolithic, these 
views are epistemologically diverse and range from critical pragmatism 
to critical realism, from critical pedagogy to critical theory, and even 
to poststructuralism (see discussions in Bygate,  2005 ; Corson,  1997 ; 
Crookes,  2005 ; McNamara,  2012 ; Pennycook,  2010 ). 
 NOT TWO BUT MULTIPLE UNDERSTANDINGS OF GAP BRIDGING 
 Ontological bridges might be built to look quite different. Ellis’s is one 
example. Lantolf, in his contribution to this article, offers a quite dif-
ferent example, choosing a different theory that helps build another 
ontological bridge: Vygotskian sociocultural theory. His choice of theory 
helps bridge the gap organically and naturally, to the point that no gap 
is felt, and no bridge is needed. This is done not through complemen-
tarity, however, but by recognizing that the dialectic between social 
activity and mental activity is mediated by language and cultural artifacts. 
The aspiration to undo ontological dualisms and dichotomies is shared 
by Vygotskian sociocultural psychology and by usage-based approaches 
(see N. C. Ellis & Larsen-Freeman,  2006 ). The dualisms, however, are 
overcome by different means, either at the intratheoretical or at the 
metatheoretical level. 
 Bridge traveling, or the integration of the cognitive and the social within 
a single study or within the same research program, can also occur in 
different ways. Bigelow’s account is one example. Mackey, in her contri-
bution to this article, offers a different case when she recounts how her 
research practices and overall research program changed to better 
balance social and cognitive factors. In Mackey’s case, the changes 
seem to have been prompted by theoretical pressures brought about 
by the social turn in the fi eld of SLA (Block,  2003 ). Mackey’s process is 
perhaps best described by Fleck’s (1935/1979) notion of stylized remod-
eling (discussed by Young in this article). No researcher or research 
community can forever be insulated from surrounding intellectual 
developments. Eventually, he or she will be changed by varying degrees 
of familiarity with those developments. Theoretical pressures to bridge 
the gap such as those underlying Mackey’s case are very different from 
the bottom-up, real-world pressures described by Bigelow. 
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 QUESTIONS OF (IN)COMMENSURABILITY, ALWAYS PENDING 
 I have created two metaphors, bridge building and bridge traveling, to 
characterize the positions taken by Ellis and Bigelow in this article. This 
rhetorical move allows me to suggest that it is possible for individual 
researchers to learn from felt cognitive-social tensions and to act on them 
positively across different epistemic lines along the shores of the gap. 
I have also suggested that there are not one or two but several ways to 
respond positively to the gap, as in the parallels and differences between 
Ellis and Lantolf in their contributions, on the one hand, and between 
Bigelow and Mackey in theirs, on the other. Yet, with these two rhetorical 
moves, I would not want to minimize important questions and tensions 
that run through the contributions in this article under the theme of (in)
commensurability. Just how possible are mutual understanding and 
successful communication across different research communities that 
stand at different sides of the cognitive-social gap? In thinking about this 
question, it is important to remember that views regarding (in)commensu-
rability are greatly diverse across relevant fi elds, such as the philos-
ophy of science; history of ideas; or science, technology, and social 
studies. I choose to discuss here three positions toward the problem of 
(in)commensurability that have been distinguished by Holbrook ( 2013 ). 
 A well-known model of interdisciplinary communication is offered by 
Habermas (1981/1984), who argued that commensurability, or at least 
reciprocal understanding, is a tall order, though possible through the 
human capacity to engage in rational, action-oriented deliberation. 
The best-known position overall, however, is Kuhn (1962/1996), who 
was inclined toward incommensurability. Communication attempts that 
build on the shaky grounds of translation (always less satisfying than 
access to the original), argued Kuhn, will result in nonunderstanding or, 
worse, in overestimation of understanding and thus misunderstanding. 
The only solution would be for researchers from different communities 
to learn one another’s discourses, though developing such interdiscur-
sive competence may prove extremely diffi cult, if not impossible. 
 As an alternative to the Habermasian and Kuhnian renditions of the 
dilemma of (in)commensurability, Holbrook ( 2013 ) offers a third option, 
the refl ective invention model, crafted from his reading of Bataille 
(1957/1993) and Lyotard (1983/1988). This model predicts that attempts at 
establishing understanding across epistemic boundaries will eventually 
lead to communicative breakdown precisely because each interlocutor, 
by virtue of being a member of a different thought collective, holds dif-
ferent assumptions and plays by different rules of the game of knowledge 
construction. (This is the perspective emphasized in the contributions 
to this article by DeKeyser, Hulstijn, Talmy, and Young.) The breakdown 
point marks the recognition of belonging to different epistemic discourses. 
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And it is at the point of recognition of difference that the response 
becomes a critical choice:
 We can certainly answer by reasserting our (disciplinary) identities. 
In doing so, however, we forego the possibility of strong (interdisciplinary) 
communication. Such communication is possible only between individuals 
who risk their disciplinary identities and sacrifi ce them to the possibility of 
co-creating a new, shared genre of discourse. (Holbrook,  2013 , p. 1878) 
 I fi nd the Bataille-Lyotard refl ective invention model poignant and 
useful. Through this lens, (in)commensurability can be seen as a local, 
emergent achievement whose centripetal impulse is located in critical 
moments afforded by a recognition of difference, which are then resolved 
either by reaffi rming one’s own epistemological identity and intellectual 
affi liations and thereby retreating from the possibility of communication 
(i.e., choosing incommensurability) or by transcending those differences 
in some way and keeping up the hard work of achieving at least some 
degree of success in communication (i.e., choosing commensurability). 
 Let us assume, then, that moments of recognition of difference and immi-
nent communication breakdown are opportunities either to lock into 
incommensurability or to choose to work toward commensurability. What 
might be conditions that can sway individual researchers to choose to 
work toward commensurability? I would like to put forth two tentative 
answers. One draws from the rationalist traditions that predominate in the 
philosophy of science and that are likely to be familiar to many readers. 
The other looks for inspiration into poststructuralist traditions in postco-
lonial studies and feminist studies that may be less familiar to many 
readers. I include both as epistemological translations of each other, fully 
cognizant of their distinct potential to reach and persuade different readers. 
 RATIONALIST AND POSTSTRUCTURALIST INROADS INTO 
COMMENSURABILITY 
 From the rationalist tradition of philosophy of science, it is relevant to 
search for intellectual predispositions that may support commensura-
bility. Understanding seems a necessary but not suffi cient condition 
to achieve commensurability. Once the difference is recognized and 
understood, one can always opt out of communication efforts. Nor is 
knowledge an antidote for incommensurability because the deeper 
one’s knowledge of someone else’s thought collective becomes, the 
more acutely one recognizes the limits of superfi cial translation across 
thought styles. This may, in itself, lead to hopelessness and communi-
cative disengagement at the edges of the gap. Respect for epistemolog-
ical and methodological difference is also likely to be insuffi cient. For 
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example, there is respect in Ellis’s bridge-building proposal when he 
exhorts researchers to interact across disciplines and to abhor intellec-
tual isolationism. But the question remains: Can researchers truly com-
municate when they are members of complementary yet independent 
research communities? 
 Tolerance of ambiguity, trust, and self-refl exivity may be among the 
needed ingredients, according to a panel of natural and social scientists 
who were charged by the European Science Foundation to evaluate 
felicitous conditions for interdisciplinary collaborations (ESF Standing 
Committee for the Social Sciences,  2013 ). Tolerance of ambiguity is 
required in communication with colleagues “whose research might, for 
example, look dangerously reductive or trivially broad from the point of 
view of their own epistemic community” (ESF Standing Committee for 
the Social Sciences,  2013 , p. 21). In turn, such ambiguities are likely 
more tolerable, the panel concluded, when trust among individual 
researchers is strong. Being able and willing to trust is often associated 
with self-refl exivity, as “researchers frequently seek out trustworthy 
others, and also become willing to trust, only after critical refl ection on 
the qualities of, and gaps within, their own disciplines and methods” 
(ESF Standing Committee for the Social Sciences,  2013 , p. 21). This ele-
ment of self-refl exivity is important in the interpretive turn called for by 
Talmy in his contribution to this article. 
 Support for commensurability can also be found in poststructuralist 
thinking. From this perspective, feelings of inner tension and threats to 
researcher identity can be uniquely illuminated by a willingness to con-
front questions of moral values. As social scientists like Kirschner ( 2013 ) 
put it, this requires going well beyond cold rationalism and drawing 
from nontraditional, visceral explorations of ideologies and ethical con-
sequences of knowledge. The key condition supporting commensura-
bility from the poststructuralist perspective is a willingness to transcend 
dichotomous epistemic boundaries. Two good candidates for doing 
this are the construct of an  interstitial view offered by postcolonial 
literary theorist Bhabha (1994/2004) and the notion of  “world”-traveling 
proposed by feminist philosopher Lugones ( 2003 ). 
 Bhabha (1994/2004) proposed that human beings have the capacity 
to achieve an interstitial view when, in the unfolding of an experience of 
marginality, they manage to displace the dichotomous assumptions 
implicit in a difference they recognize and suffer; by doing so they are able 
to reach beyond the other-imposed and self-imposed dichotomy and 
assert their right to difference in equality. Bhabha explained: “It is in the 
emergence of the interstices—the overlap and displacement of domains 
of difference—that the intersubjective and collective experiences of 
 nationness , community interest, or cultural value are negotiated” (p. 2). 
Lugones ( 2003 ) proposed that human beings have the capacity to travel 
symbolically to someone else’s world when we “understand  what it is to 
Bridging the Gap 413
be them and what it is to be ourselves in their eyes ” (p. 97). This “world”-
traveling in turn facilitates empathy and the recognition of the other as 
a valuable, legitimate interlocutor because “only when we have traveled 
to each other’s ‘worlds’ are we fully subjects to each other” (Lugones, 
 2003 , p. 97); by cultivating “world”-traveling, resistance to oppression 
and coalitions across different kinds of marginality can be achieved. In 
other words,  complex communication is achieved (Lugones,  2006 ). 
 HOPEFUL COMMENSURABILITIES 
 Ultimately, the two answers to the challenge of cultivating commensu-
rability I have offered are epistemological translations of each other. 
Readers will have to judge how superfi cial or successful the translation 
work is. As in all translations, my purpose in considering both has been 
one of reaching across linguistic and epistemological boundaries. 
 Rationalist answers to the conundrum of (in)commensurability, such 
as those offered by the ESF Standing Committee for the Social Sciences 
( 2013 ), are helpful. Understanding, knowledge, respect, tolerance of 
ambiguity, trust, and self-refl exivity may all be important resources that 
individual researchers should cultivate if they are interested in closing 
the cognitive-social gap in the study of language learning and use. But 
these rationalist explanations are also somewhat limited: These virtues 
do not explain what ignites some researchers’ desire to achieve mutual 
understanding and communication, particularly when the ideals of 
bridge building and bridge traveling may risk disciplinary identities, as 
Holbrook ( 2013 ) puts it and as Bigelow suggests on the basis of her own 
experience. How, when, and why, for example, would one even know 
that the trouble is worthwhile? More visceral analyses such as those 
offered by Bhabha (1994/2004) or Lugones ( 2003 ) offer helpful ways 
of deepening our appraisal of (in)commensurability as an emergent 
achievement of the Bataille-Lyotard kind (Holbrook,  2013 ). It is through 
liminal, performative processes such as the interstitial view and “world”-
traveling that the recognition of difference during communication across 
epistemic communities may end up being seized as a momentary 
opportunity for working at commensurability. In critical rationalist 
epistemologies, these emotional-affective, relational-empathic, and moral-
political accounts of commensurability fall outside the proper domain 
of knowledge and science. However, in a wide range of constructivist, 
structuralist, and poststructuralist epistemologies, knowledge is viewed as 
value laden and ideological. There is, thus, more willingness for researchers 
to feel they are accountable to axiological dimensions of knowledge and to 
acknowledge that they are infl uenced by them in their research praxis. 
 In the end, however, it should be clear that commensurability cannot 
be thought of as a constant virtue, only as an emergent achievement. 
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Complete, permanent commensurability is not possible, nor is it desirable. 
For one, ways of thinking and knowing are not monolithic but encompass 
considerable internal heterogeneity, both across sides of any perceived 
gap and within the same thought collective (Bronson & Watson-Gegeo, 
 2008 ; Philips,  2004 ). Moreover, the preservation and coexistence of a 
degree of incommensurability within the fi eld, or the cultivation of epis-
temological pluralism, is a good thing (Ortega,  2011 ). It may be wiser, 
therefore, to think of commensurabilities, in plural, as strategically cho-
sen acts whose value is contingent on local purposes and dynamic con-
ditions, acts that are always unfi nished and ongoing, in a precarious but 
hopeful temporary balance. 
 CONCLUSION 
 Bridge building and bridge traveling in research in L2 learning and teaching 
are possible and worthwhile endeavors. Many researchers may feel 
confl icted by the perception of a cognitive-social gap. But many have 
also built bridges that allow multiple formats for traveling back and 
forth, for those who so desire, and bridge travelers willing to venture on 
them are likely to be on the rise. I hope that within reach in the future of 
our disciplines is also an even more radical reinterpretation of the felt 
cognitive-social gap. The bridges are not one or two but many: They 
spread along a variety of disciplinary topographies and, thus, are differ-
ently located alongside the gap, and they are of many different shapes 
and sizes. The traffi c back and forth over these bridges is unpredict-
able, bidirectional, and ever fl owing. Whatever cognitive-social tensions 
we feel, it will be good for researchers to learn to imagine the gap not as 
an imminent disciplinary demise but as a compelling invitation to build 
and travel many bridges. The cognitive-social gap can be an opportunity 
to open up new paths to knowledge creation. 
 EDITORS’ CLOSING THOUGHTS 
 Looking back at the contributions to the original 2013 AAAL colloquium, 
the lively and positive audience interaction they inspired, and the result-
ing formulations gathered in this article, we believe we can legitimately 
draw the following two conclusions. First, contributors agree that there 
is no single, monolithic social-cognitive gap in L2 learning and teaching 
research, or at least there need not or ought not to be a gap. The contri-
butions gathered in this article succeed in disentangling various indepen-
dent contrasts in ontology, epistemology, and methodology, distinguishing 
a range of views rather than a single dichotomy. Furthermore, whereas it 
is true that, as one member of the colloquium audience remarked, when 
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a gap is bridged there is still a gap, we note that genuine attempts to build 
bridges constitute attempts to understand views on the other side, which 
cannot but lead one to refl ect on one’s own stance. We trust that the con-
tributions to the colloquium and to this article have shown many areas 
for dialogue and collaboration. 
 Received  9  December  2013 
 NOTES 
 1.  Hulstijn, Young, and Ortega recognize by name the contributions of the following 
colleagues, whose identity is known to the editors from audio recordings of the colloquium 
and who offered important thoughts that we have incorporated into our discussion: 
Dwight Atkinson, Andrew Cohen, Rod Ellis, Agnes He, Brian MacWhinney, Paul Matsuda, 
John Norris, Bonny Norton, Elaine Tarone, Steven Thorne, Albert Valdman, and Henry 
Widdowson. They are particularly grateful to Heidi Byrnes for introducing the ideas of 
Ludwik Fleck, whose work they subsequently read and have cited in this article. 
 2.  Translated from the Spanish by Lantolf. 
 3.  Talmy is grateful to Jan Hulstijn and Richard Young for inviting him to partici-
pate in this colloquium and to the many audience participants who helped transform 
the debate into discussion. He particularly thanks Keith Richards, Patsy Duff, Ryan 
Deschambault, and Meike Wernicke-Heinrichs for their comments on earlier drafts. All 
remaining errors are his own. 
 4.  By “epistemic” Ortega means (in her own defi nition): refl ective of any kind of the-
oretical knowledge gleaned from systematic evidence collected through the practice of 
science and scholarly inquiry. She fi nds this adjective is a useful alternative to  scientifi c 
or  epistemological , as it is more explicitly inclusive of any knowledge generated in the 
natural and physical sciences, in the social sciences, and in the humanities. 
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